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GREAT EXPECTATIONS AND MISMATCHED
COMPENSATION: GOVERNMENT SPONSORED
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
COMMISSION
CARL TOBIAS*

During the last twenty years, numerous proposals for enhancing the
quality of federal administrative agency decisionmaking have been offered, but few actually were implemented. One controversial approach,
with which fourteen agencies experimented, has been the reimbursement
of non-regulated individuals and organizations for the costs of their involvement in administrative proceedings. 1 A principal purpose of that
public funding was to improve agency decisionmaking by rectifying the
participatory imbalance between regulated parties and non-commercial
interests involved in administrative initiatives; however, little of the government-supported citizen activity that occurred has been analyzed. Participant compensation effectively has been discontinued and most agency
proceedings in which there was reimbursed public involvement have been
completed. 2 But before the memories of persons familiar with funded
activity fade and additional sources of information are lost, it is appropri* Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Barry Boyer, Bari Burke, Ernest Gellhorn, Tom Huff, Bill Luneburg, Dick Merrill, Bill Rossbach, Peggy Sanner and Roy Schotland for
their valuable suggestions and to George Ball, Beverly Barnett, and Jeff Befort for their helpful
research assistance. Thanks also to the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support and to Beth
Stevenson for indefatigable typing. Thanks as well to all who so generously expressed their opinions
of funded public participation. I am responsible for any errors that remain.
I. The terms "reimbursement," "compensation," and "funding" are used synonymously in
this Article to mean voluntary payment from agency resources for expenses incurred by public participants in administrative proceedings. The words "public" and "citizen" are employed interchangeably to mean "non-industry." The terms "involvement," "participation" and "activity" are
used synonymously to mean input intended to contribute to the resolution of issues in proceedings.
"Efficacy" and "effectiveness" are employed interchangeably to describe the impact public participation has on agency decisionmaking.
2. I have ascribed discontinuation to "judicial interpretation, antiregulatory reaction, budgetcutting, and bureaucratic caution." Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resolving the
Issue ofAgency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 906, 955 (1982). Although citizen funding was not discontinued officially by many agencies
until 1982 and several still are authorized to provide compensation, it was effectively discontinued
with the advent of the present Administration. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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ate to evaluate some compensated participation to ascertain its quality
and how the involvement affected government decisional processes. One
way of accomplishing this is to examine reimbursed citizen activity in
initiatives conducted by the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC). That agency paid many individuals and groups involved in numerous proceedings during a nine-year period to perform a number of
tasks in diverse contexts. 3
The initial section of this Article describes the origins and development of participant funding, focusing on the Consumer Product Safety
Commission's institution and implementation of the compensation concept. The second part of the Article assesses the quality, and the impact
on administrative decisionmaking, of the reimbursed public involvement
that occurred at the Commission. The third portion draws conclusions
about funded activity in agency matters from the CPSC's experience, and
the final section offers suggestions for future experimentation.

I.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF PARTICIPANT REIMBURSEMENT

A.

Government-wide Participant Reimbursement

1.

Origins and Early Development

The background of the compensation idea need only be examined
briefly in this Article. 4 The conventional wisdom for some time has been
that an important deficiency in administrative decisionmaking is bias toward interests regulated by the government. 5 This phenomenon has been
explained in numerous ways; theories of "client capture," "revolving
doors" between regulated industry and regulating agency, conflict avoidance, and overly general congressional delegations are but a few. 6 Many
3. See infra text accompanying notes 68-99.
4. Others have competently treated the difficulties that the funding concept was designed to
remedy. See Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981);
Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975); Note,
Federal Agency Assistance to Impecunious Intervenors, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1975). Cf. Tobias,
supra note 2, at § 1 (additional discussion of concept's origins and implementation). See generally J.
FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGmMACY (1978); Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98
HARV. L. REV. 507 (1985); Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
11S9 (1986) (discussions of ferment in administrative law relevant to rise of compensation).
5. See, e.g., the sources cited supra note 4; Gellhom, Public Participation in Administrative
Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972); Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L.
REV. 1069 (1971) and the sources cited therein.
6. These theories and other explanations for industry-oriented decisionmaking are explored in
Cramton, The Why, Where and How ofBroadened Public Participation in the Administratfre Process,
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critiques of the administrative process, however, mention the participatory discrepancy in agency proceedings between regulated parties
and non-commercial interests. 7 Because the information on which administrative officials premise their determinations is submitted principally by regulated entities, agency choices predictably reflect the
perspectives of industry interests. 8 A primary reason for the disparities
in involvement and input of non-commercial and regulated parties is the
substantial expense of participation in administrative initiatives.9 The
view thus evolved that if the public could enhance agency decisionmaking by providing more balanced involvement and data, but was stymied
by resource deficiencies, the government should encourage non-commercial participation by affording economic assistance. 10 Citizen funding
was one response to these considerations. 11
60 GEO. L.J. 525, 527-30 (1972); Lazarus & Onek, supra note 5, at 1092-94; Stewart, supra note 4, at
1681-89, 1713-15; Note, supra note 4, at 1815-17.
7. This difficulty has been examined thoroughly in Cramton, supra note 6; Gellhorn, supra
note 5; Stewart, supra note 4. It is important to remember that imbalanced involvement is one
theory among many espoused to explain why agency decisionmaking reflects the views of the industry being regulated. There also are numerous explanations for other deficiencies in the broader
administrative process. Moreover, public participation is only a "process" solution to what some
critics view as the more fundamental ills of administrative government. See Sax, The (Unhappy)
Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239 (1973); Stewart, supra note 4.
8. See Cramton, supra note 6, at 529-30; Tobias, supra note 2, at 908.
9. See 3 SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION:
PtiBLIC PARTICIPATION IN REGULATORY AGENCY PROCEEDINGS, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. vii (1977)
[hereinafter cited as PUBLIC PARTICIPATION STUDY]; cf. Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (costs will limit number ofintervenon). For cost estimates, see PUBLIC PARTICIPATION STUDY, at 17-22; Cramton, supra note 6, at
538; Gellhorn, supra, note 5, at 389-96.
10. See, e.g., PUBLIC PARTICIPATION STUDY, supra note 9, at chs. 1, 2, 7; Public Participation
in Federal Agency Proceedings Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 270 Before the Subcomm. on Administrati~ Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 270 Hearings]; Public Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings: Hearings on S.

2715 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as S. 2715 Hearings].
11. Of course, numerous additional solutions have been proposed to the problem of participatory imbalance and to other difficulties that plague administrative decisionmaking and government. Some are explored in the sources cited supra notes 4, 5, 7 and S. REP. No. 94-863, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976). For recent expositions, see A Symposium on Administrative Law, The
Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REV. No. 2 (1987); Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 Mo. L. REV. 86 (1986). Moreover, the account in this paragraph is
premised on an "interest representation" model of the administrative process propounded most comprehensively in Stewart, supra note 4. Models are matters for ongoing debate. See, e.g., Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1984); Sunstein, Factions, Se/flnterest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 281-92 (1986). Cf. Cass,
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In 1969, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) explored ideas which were the
conceptual predecessors of participant reimbursement. After studying
the involvement of indigent people in federal rulemaking, the Administrative Conference recommended that agencies compensate such individuals for the personal expenditures and lost wages they incurred when
participating in administrative hearings and that Congress provide the
requisite resources for this activity. 12 The Federal Trade Commission examined funding in the context of extending financial assistance to impecunious respondents charged in unfair practice proceedings. 13 During
1970, the FTC continued to wrestle with the reimbursement concept, 14
and two commentators analyzed the possibility of government sponsorship of public involvement and found that participant funding warranted
additional exploration. 15 In 1971, the members of the Administrative
Conference supported the expansion of citizens' rights to participate in
agency initiatives but rejected a recommendation that contemplated
practical implementation of reimbursement. 16 Moreover, the FTC commissioners, who strongly disagreed about the legality and advisability of
compensation asked the Comptroller General of the United States
whether the agency possessed sufficient authority to pay fees and costs
incurred by indigent respondents and impecunious intervenors. 17 When
Models ofAdministrative Action, 72 VA. L. REV. 363 (1986); Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The
Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1495-99 (1983) (analysis of models).
12. See Administrative Conf. of the United States, Representation of the Poor in Agency
RulemakingofDirect Consequence to Them in 1 Ao. CONF. U.S. RECOMMENDATIONS & REP. 19681970, at 71 (1970) (recommendation No. 5). ACUS premised its recommendation on a report prepared for it by Professor Bonfield. See Bonfield, Representation for the Poor i11 Federal Ru/emaking,
67 MICH. L. REV. 511, 556 (1969).
13. See American Chinchilla Corp., 76 F.T.C. 1016, 1037-38 (1969).
14. For a comprehensive examination of the FTC's travails, see Boyer, Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: The Federal Trade Commission Experience, 70 GEO. L.J. 51, 53-54
n.12 (1981).
15. See Lazarus & Onek, supra note 5, at 1098-1103.
16. See Administrative Conf. of the United States, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings in 2 Ao. CONF. U.S. RECOMMENDATIONS & REP. 1970-1972, at 376 (1971) (recommendation No. 28).
17. See In re Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 78 F.T.C. 1572, 1573 (1971) (interlocutory order);
Letter from Miles W. Kirkpatrick, Chairman, FTC, to Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General (Mar.
17, 1971). "The Comptroller General is the head of the General Accounting Office (GAO), an
independent agency within the legislative branch created as a fiscal watchdog of the agencies," who
is authorized to issue opinions about agency power to spend appropriated money. Tobias, supra note
2, at 912 n.52. Cf. id. (additional discussion of Comptroller and official's responsibilities). The terms
"power" and "authority" are used interchangeably in this Article to describe the means by which
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the financial officer answered the next year that such activity "would
constitute a proper exercise of administrative discretion," 18 the Federal
Trade Commission relied upon its implied power to fund participant involvement in one agency proceeding. 19
2.

Decisions of the Comptroller General

The Comptroller General subsequently reaffirmed the view on reimbursement authority first enunciated in the decision issued at the behest
of the FTC, and in a number of rulings, the fiscal official ultimately held
that ten additional governmental entities, including the Consumer Product Safety Commission, had implied compensation power and recognized
that many other units of government might possess the requisite authority. 20 The Comptroller General determined that funding would be appropriate when an agency ascertained that a participant's proposed input
could "reasonably be expected to contribute substantially to a full and
fair determination of the issues before it" and "lack of financial resources
on the part of the person involved would preclude participation without
reimbursement." 21 These opinions of the Comptroller General influenced the decisions of numerous governmental entities which employed
implied power to fund members of the public involved in administrative
proceedings. 22
3.

Congressional Activity

In the l 970's, Congress specifically empowered several agencies to reimburse citizens in certain contexts. 23 The 1972 Consumer Product
Safety Act creating the Consumer Product Safety Commission provided
for a type of participant compensation. 24 During 1975, Congress authorized funding by the FTC in hybrid rulemakings conducted under the
agencies justify funding public participants. Cf Tobias, supra note 2 (more discussion of agency
authority).
18. See Letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General, to Miles W. Kirkpatrick, Chairman,
FTC (Aug. 10, 1972), reprinted in S. 2715 Hearings, supra note 10, at 281.
19. See In re Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 1032 (1972).
20. For a discussion of the Comptroller's opinions, see Tobias, supra note 2, at § I.C.2.
21. Letter from R.F. Keller, Deputy Comptroller General, to Rep. John E. Moss, Chairman,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (May
10, 1976), reprinted in S. 270 Hearings, supra note 10, at 428.
22. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 17,507 (1979); id. at 23,046, 70,743.
23. It is important to remember the difference between specific and implied compensation authority. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 906 n.1.
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(d)(2) (1976).
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Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission legislation. 25 In 1976, the
legislature provided for compensation by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in the Toxic Substances Control Act. 26 During 1977, the
legislative branch granted the Department of State (DOS) power to reimburse. 27 In 1978, Congress allowed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to fund in the Department of Energy reorganization
legislation. 28 During 1980, Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice
Act which provided on an experimental basis for the recovery of expenses by interests such as small businesses that prevailed against agencies in adversarial adjudicatory matters, and in 1985, the legislature gave
that effort permanent status. 29 Since 1975, members of Congress have
introduced substantive proposals permitting or prohibiting governmentwide participant reimbursement, but none of the bills has passed. 30
Although Congress occasionally employs the appropriations process to
inform agencies that they may pay for citizen involvement, 31 the legislative branch more frequently relies upon the process to instruct governmental entities that compensation is improper. 32

4.

Agency and Presidential Activity

Since 1969, approximately twenty units of government have expressed
interest in funding, while fourteen actually have exercised specific or implied power to reimburse members of the public involved in their proceedings. Five administrative agencies compensated non-commercial
parties in single initiatives. 33 The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
25. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (1976).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(4) (1976).
27. 22 U.S.C. § 2692 (Supp. III 1979).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 825q-1 (Supp. III 1979).
29. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§ 201-208, 94 Stat. 2312, 2325-30
(1980); cf. Dods & Kennedy, The Equal Access to Justice Act, 50 UMKC L. REV. 48 (1981); Robertson & Fowler, Recovering Attorneys' Fees from the Government Under the Equal Access to Justice
Act, 56 Tu!. L. Rev. 903 (1982) (analysis of legislation). In August 1985, Congress amended and
made permanent what it described as a three-year experiment. See Equal Access to Justice Act,
Extension and Amendment, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985).
30. For a discussion of these legislative proposals, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 917-18. For a
discussion of additional significant Congressional activity in the authorization process, see id. at 91418.
31. For a discussion of this legislative activity, see id. at 914-17.
32. For a discussion of this legislative activity, see id. at 914-17.
33. The five agencies are the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development and the Department of Agriculture. See OFFICE OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES, U.S. ENVI-

Number4]

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

1107

funded non-industry interests in two instances, and the Department of
Energy (DOE) and the Food and Drug Administration {FDA) did so in
three. 34 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) of the Commerce Department reimbursed citizen participants
in three proceedings involving marine sanctuaries and three rulemakings. 35 The National Commission on Air Quality (NCAQ) paid the expenses of members of the public who attended ten workshops and a
number of meetings held in regional study areas. 36 The State Department compensated individuals to serve as private-sector advisers on
United States delegations to fifteen sessions in which international commodity and civil aviation agreements were negotiated, 37 as well as to attend nine meetings of the Department's Advisory Committee on
International Investment, Technology and Development, several intraagency meetings and a "consumer affairs seminar." 38 The National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) of the Department of
Transportation (DOT) reimbursed many non-regulated people and
groups in fourteen initiatives, most of which pertained to standard-setting. 39 The Federal Trade Commission relied upon explicit statutory aullONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PCB PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PILOT SUMMARY (1978) (EPA);

S. 270 Hearings, supra note 10, at 94-95 (statement of Department of Transportation Secretary Coleman) (Federal Aviation Administration); 45 Fed. Reg. 83, 171 (1980) (Department of Health and
Human Services); Regulatory Reform Hearings on S. 104, S. 262, S. 299, S. 755 & S. 1251 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., !st Sess., pt. 2, at 173 (1979) (statement of Mass. Lieutenant Governor Thomas O'Neill, III)
(Department of Housing and Urban Development) [hereinafter cited as S. 104 Hearings]; Chamber
of Commerce v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 459 F. Supp. 216 (D.D.C. 1978) (United States
Department of Agriculture). For discussion of agency and presidential activity, see Tobias supra
note 2, at 910-12. Copies of all agency documents cited in this Article should be available in the
agencies' files.
34. See ROBARDS, CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD COMPENSATED PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROGRAM EVALUATION (Sept. 15, 1980) (CAB); Letter from J. Dexter Peach, Director, Energy and
Minerals Divisions, GAO, to Rep. David A. Stockman (Oct. 2, 1978) (DOE) [hereinafter cited as
Peach Letter]; SMITH, PRELIMINAJlY AssESSMENT OF THE FDA's PILOT PUBLIC REIMBURSEMENT
PROGRAM (1980) (FDA) [hereinafter cited as FDA STUDY].
35. See Memorandum from Phyllis Jackson, Staff Attorney, NOAA Office of General Counsel,
to Eldon Greenberg, NOAA General Counsel (Jan. 28, 1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 9820, 9861 (1982).
36. See 45 Fed. Reg. 98 (1980). Clean Air Act Amendments, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 323j,
91 Stat. 685, 785-88 (1977).
37. See DOS Memoranda on Biden Funding (1981-1984). Coffee and tin are examples of the
commodities.
38. See id.
39. See DOT DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL Ass!STANCE TO PARTICIPANTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS: NHTSA EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1977).
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thority to compensate a large number of non-commercial parties in
eighteen hybrid rulemakings and upon implied power to fund one entity
in another proceeding.40
From 1974 until 1980, several additional units of government evinced
interest in reimbursing non-industry participants but never actually did
so.41 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Department
of the Interior, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the National Telecommunication and Information Administration of the Commerce Department issued proposals or Notices of Inquiry seeking public
comment on the possible institution of compensation efforts,42 but none
of these agencies in fact created a program or funded any member of the
public.43 The Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of Transportation also considered
department-wide reimbursement. 44 But only their constituent agencies,
such as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration of the Department of Transportation, paid participants in specific initiatives. 45
Thus, while nearly twenty governmental entities have evidenced interest in citizen compensation since 1969, only fourteen have funded noncommercial individuals or organizations. Before 1977 some reimbursement was paid on an ad hoc basis pursuant to implied power. Of the
agencies employing such authority, the Civil Aeronautics Board sus40. See RULEMAKING UNDER THE MAGNUSON-Moss WARRANTY-FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION IMPROVEMENT ACT (June 1979) (explicit funding authority); supra note 19 and accompanying text (implied funding authority).
41. Other agencies undoubtedly were interested but never formally indicated so. Cf. Peach
Letter, supra note 34 (indication of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation interest but no agency
money expended on funding).
42. For discussion of consideration accorded to participant funding by all these agencies, except
the Department of the Interior, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 910-12. Cf. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,339 (1978)
(Interior).
43. The FCC did issue a regulation that afforded procedural help to impecunious participants
in its proceedings. See 41 Fed. Reg. 53,019 (1976).
44. These assertions are based on telephone interviews with agency employees who considered
department-wide funding; on actual consideration of funding by multiple constituents of the agencies, see, e.g., supra notes 35, 42 and accompanying text (Commerce Department consideration); and
on payments made by each agency's constituents, see infra note 45 and accompanying text. Cf. 44
Fed. Reg. 65,278 (1979) (DOE); 45 Fed. Reg. 14,068 (1980) (HUD); 42 Fed. Reg. 2863 (1977)
(NHTSA) (Federal Register documents indicating interest).
45. See supra notes 33 (USDA and HUD), 34 (DOE), 35 (Commerce), 33, 34 (HHS), 33, 39
(DOT).
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pended its endeavor in 1980,46 and the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration and the Department of Agriculture discontinued operations in 1982, "influenced by the adverse political climate and by doubts
about the scope of their power." 47 Of those agencies with specific authority, the Consumer Product Safety Commission has paid no one since
1982; the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission have been admonished annually for a number of
years by appropriations committees that they are not to do so; and the
FTC ceased requesting money for funding in its budget after 1980. Thus,
the State Department is the only entity currently operating a program,
albeit a limited one. Some participant reimbursement occurred during
the Republican administrations of Presidents Nixon, Ford and Reagan.
President Ford warmly supported, and even promoted, broadened nonindustry involvement in agency initiatives.48 But an overwhelming majority of funding activity undertaken by the federal government transpired during the Democratic administration of President Carter. Carter
was the only President to explicitly endorse compensation, recognizing
the "need for public participation funding and [strongly encouraging
each] agency with the requisite authority to institute a public participation funding program. " 49

5.

Judicial Decisions

In numerous oprmons, judges have mentioned the reimbursement
idea; 50 however, there have been only four cases challenging agency
power to compensate non-commercial interests. When the Chamber of
Commerce attacked the validity of Department of Energy funding under
implied authority, the District of Columbia district and circuit courts
refused to address the substantive issue. 51 But in three cases, courts did
46. See 45 Fed. Reg. 29,035 (1980).
47. Tobias, supra note 2, at 912 n.51. Cf id. (citations for all agencies except NHTSA); 47
Fed. Reg. 29,678 (1982) (NHTSA).
48. As to President Ford's support, see 41 Fed. Reg. 42,761 (1976).
49. See Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from President
Carter, May 16, 1979, I Public Papers of the President, Jimmy Carter, 1979, at 867. Cf Exec. Order
No. 12,044 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978) (Carter endorsements, and promotion, of expanded
public participation).
50. See cases listed in Tobias, supra note 2, at 918 n.98. For discussion of agency compensation
authority, see Tobias, supra note 2.
51. The circuit opinion, Chamber of Commerce v. Dep't of Energy, 627 F.2d 289, 291 (D.C.
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reach the merits of agency authority to fund, and a number of federal
judges resolved the question quite differently.s 2 During 1977, the sharply
split Second Circuit, sitting en bane, denied requests by intervenors in a
Federal Power Commission licensing matter who asked the court to order that the Commission pay the intervenors' costs.s3 In 1978, a District
of Columbia district court judge determined that the Department of Agriculture had implied authority to compensate a public interest group for
assessing the economic impact of a Department proposal. s4 Moreover,
during 1981, a divided Fourth Circuit panel ruled that the Food and
Drug Administration lacked implied funding power.ss
6.

Prior Studies of Reimbursed Participation

The quality of compensated non-commercial involvement and the impact that the activity has had upon administrative decisionmaking are
exceedingly difficult to analyze. s6 It is entirely predictable, therefore,
that no thoroughgoing examination of the quality or efficacy of funded
participation has been performed.
Reimbursed involvement at five agencies has not been evaluated. s7
The Department of State and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration compiled lists of the initiatives in which they compensated participants. ss Six governmental entities, including the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, have used employees to conduct assessments. s9 But the self-studies are not critical and are vulnerable to challenge, partly because they apparently were intended to serve principally
as advocacy documents for persuading Congress of the worth of funding.
The self-studies also are terse; none assesses reimbursed activity at other
Cir. 1980) cites the unreported district court opinion of Judge June Green, No. 78-1543, Memo. Op.
at 2 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 1978).
52. For discussion of the cases, see Tobias, supra note 2, at § II.
53. See Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978).
54. See Chamber of Commerce v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 459 F. Supp. 216
(D.D.C. 1978).
55. See Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981).
56. See infra § II.A. of this Article.
57. These are FAA, HHS, HUD, NCAQ, and USDA.
58. See supra notes 37 (DOS), 35 (NOAA).
59. See supra notes 33 (EPA), 34 (CAB, FDA), 39 (NHTSA), 40 (FTC); Memorandum: Funding Under 1980 Public Participation Program (not including§ 7 (1980) (CPSC) [hereinafter cited as
CPSC Study].
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governmental units. 60 Independent evaluations commissioned by the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, Department of Energy and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission when considering the institution of
funding did not analyze quality or efficacy. 61
There are a few extra-agency evaluations of reimbursed participation.
An Administrative Conference consultant rigorously assessed compensated involvement in the Federal Trade Commission's ophthalmic-goods
rulemaking. 62 One law student analyzed funded input in a Department
of Energy hearing, 63 and two law students examined the Consumer Product Safety Commission's asbestos rulemaking, 64 a National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration public meeting, and a National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration proceeding while incorporating by reference the above evaluations of the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Energy. 65 When analyzing agency reimbursement authority, I scrutinized some compensated participation. 66 There is much
testimony before congressional authorization and appropriations committees about funded citizen activity. Although many witnesses have offered general or anecdotal observations, a number have extolled or
castigated reimbursed involvement in such categorical or unsubstantiated
ways that the testimony seems principally to reflect personal political
60. The FDA STUDY, supra note 34, at chs. 6-7, alludes to compensated involvement at other
agencies but only incorporates what is said in the intra-agency evaluations listed supra note 59 and
does not purport to be a government-wide analysis.
61. See BOASBERG, HEWES, KLORES & KAss, REPORT TO THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY
CoMMISSION ON POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY INTERVENOR REQUESTS FOR FINANCIAL AssISTANCE
IN NRC PROCEEDINGS (1975), reprinted in S. 2715 Hearings, supra note 10, at 331-469 [hereinafter
cited as NRC REPORT]; CHASEN & STEIN, REPORT TO THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION ON CPSC'S OFFICE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND FINANCIAL CoMPENSATION PRO·
GRAM (1977) [hereinafter cited as CPSC EXTERNAL STUDY]; ENERGY POLICY TASK FORCE,
FUNDING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROCEEDINGS (1978).
62. See B. BOYER, COMPENSATING PUBLIC PARTICIPANTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION EXPERIENCE 97 (1980); Boyer, supra note 14 (shorter
version); American Optometric Ass'n v. FfC, 626 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 40 Fed. Reg. 39,901
(1975); 42 Fed. Reg. 41,651 (1977) (judicial challenge to, and Federal Register documents on,
ophthalmic goods rulemaking).
63. See Noble, Evaluation of Energy Policy Task Force Role in DOE Hearings (May 1979)
(unpublished paper prepared for Professor Roy Schotland, Georgetown University Law Center).
64. See Stellato & Wright, An Evaluation ofAgency Programs for the Reimbursement ofParticipation in Rulemaking Proceedings (May 1981) (unpublished paper prepared for Professor Roy
Schotland, Georgetown University Law Center).
65. See Stellato & Wright, supra note 64.
66. See Tobias, supra note 2, at § 4.
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perspectives on the advisability of compensation. 67
Therefore, evaluators have carefully analyzed a portion of the funded
public participation which occurred. The vast majority of that compensated involvement, however, has not even been examined, and much of
that studied was not assessed as rigorously as possible. Moreover, there
has been little effort to analyze comprehensively reimbursed activity at a
single agency, much less at the multiple entity or government-wide level.
In sum, many agencies have paid parties to participate in administrative
initiatives. Much of that compensated activity occurred at the Consumer
Product Safety Commission and is described thoroughly below.

B.

Participant Reimbursement At The Consumer Product Safety
Commission

The Consumer Product Safety Commission was not involved in the
earliest development of the participant funding concept because the
agency was only established in 1972. 68 Moreover, the commissioners
never sought the Comptroller General's views on compensation authority, few references to that power appear in the Comptroller's opinions,
and the CPSC's reimbursement authority was not challenged in the
courts. Nonetheless, Congress has provided for certain types of participant funding in the agency's substantive legislation and frequently has
instructed the Commission on compensation, while the CPSC experimented actively with the reimbursement idea throughout the initial decade of its existence.
1.

Congressional Activity

The agency's organic statute specifically prescribed a kind of funding
in the "offeror" process, a unique administrative procedure whereby extra-Commission entities developed proposed consumer product safety
67. See, e.g., Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: Hearings on H.R. 3361 and Related
Bills Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Government Relations of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 3361 Hearings]; S. 270, S. 271 S
Hearings, supra note 10; S. 104 Hearings, supra note 33.
68. See Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972). Cf. Scalia &
Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 899 (1973);
Special Issue: The Consumer Product Safety Commission, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. No. 4 (1975)
(discussion of CPSC, its substance, procedure and legislation); Schwartz, The Consumer Product
Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32, 3545
(1982) (discussion of CPSC's establishment).
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standards. 69 However, the offeror process proved unworkable. Congress
amended the procedure in 1978, but then abolished it during 1981 and
provided for reimbursement of parties who assist the Consumer Product
Safety Commission in drafting mandatory standards. 7° Congress, in
1980, admonished the agency not to fund under implied authority. 71 The
prohibition resulted from a misunderstanding about EPA compensation. 72 When the legislative branch precluded the Environmental Protection Agency from compensating, Congress also proscribed
reimbursement by other agencies, namely, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission and the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
included in the same appropriations statute. 73 That bar on agency funding has been renewed annually. 74

2.

Agency Activity

The legislation creating the Consumer Product Safety Commission expressly provided for a type of participant compensation. Between 1974
and 1977, the agency relied upon that grant to reimburse entities that
served as offerors and individual citizens who worked with them to develop standards for hazards associated with seven products. 75 Because
Commission provision of more than out-of-pocket expenses was contro69. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(d)(2) (1976). Cf Schwartz, supra note 68; sources cited infra note 99
(discussions of offeror process).
70. The 1978 amendment is at Pub. L. No. 95-631, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 3742, 3743 (repealed 1981).
Cf H.R. REP. No. 1164, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 9434 (reasons for amendment) [hereinafter cited as HousE OFFEROR REPORT]. The 1981
abolition legislation is at 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (Supp. V 1981). The funding provision is at 15 U.S.C.
§ 2054(a)(4) (Supp. V 1981). Cf Klayman, Standard Setting Under the Consumer Product Safety
Act Amendments of 1981-A Shift in Regulatory Philosophy, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 96 (1982)
(discussion of 1981 legislation).
71. See Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-526, § 410, 94 Stat. 3044, 3065 (1980).
72. Telephone interview with staff member 1, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee
on HUD-Independent Agencies (Jan. 28, 1985). Cf Tobias, supra note 2, at 916 n.82 (discussion of
misunderstanding and machinations attending congressional decision).
73. Congress' decision as to agencies other than the EPA apparently was not premised on conscious determinations about the efficacy or quality of funded participation at the agencies.
74. See, e.g., Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-160, § 410, 99 Stat. 909 (1985); Department of Housing and
Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-371, § 410, 98
Stat. 1213 (1984).
75. The public playground equipment proceeding, designated a "quasi-offeror" initiative by the
CPSC, is considered an offeror proceeding in this Article. The chain saw proceeding, which arguably could be considered a "quasi-offeror" initiative, is not treated as an offeror proceeding.
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versial, 76 the Consumer Product Safety Commission paid other costs,
such as lost wages, in only one initiative. 77 Moreover, negative resolution
of the question was dispositive of offeror selection in another agency matter. 78 Dissatisfaction with the offeror process, voiced by nearly everyone
involved in the seven proceedings, prompted Congress to modify the procedure in 1978, but it was not used thereafter. 79 In 1981, Congress abolished the mechanism while prescribing a form of funding which has
never been invoked.
Between 1974 and 1978, the Consumer Product Safety Commission
exercised implied power on an ad hoc basis to compensate participants in
several initiatives. 80 During 1974, when contemplating fireworks regulation, the agency reimbursed a lawyer for expenses incurred in two hearings. The next year, the commissioners authorized attorneys' fees for
indigent respondents in an enforcement proceeding, but settlement vitiated the need for funding. In 1976, the Consumer Product Safety Commission provided compensation for a lawyer and a consumer advocate
who attended an agency meeting on toy safety. During 1977, the agency
reimbursed an individual for testifying in public hearings to consider imposition of a ban on asbestos patching compounds and to examine
amendment of regulations covering sleepwear for children. Similarly, in
March 1978, the Commission funded three people who addressed the
advisability of banning unvented gas space heaters.
During April 1976, five public interest groups requested that the Consumer Product Safety Commission promulgate rules prescribing citizen
76. See Note, Inside the Proposed Standard/or Architectural Glass: An Outward Look at Consumer Participation In The CPSA's O.fferor Process, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1173, 1173-96 (1975).
77. The proceeding concerned miniature Christmas tree lights. Cf. 43 Fed. Reg. 19, 136
(1978); Schwartz, supra note 68, at 66-68 (discussion of controversy).
78. See Note, supra note 76, at 1175-96.
79. The offeror process was widely acknowledged to be unworkable. See, e.g., Harter, Negotiat·
ing Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 60-61 (1982) (offeror program a "disastrous
failure," which "by all accounts ... did not work well"); Schwartz, supra note 68, at 62-68 (documenting difficulties experienced in implementing offeror process); CPSC Oversight: Hearings Before

the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 350 (1977) (no one, including CPSC staff, offerors and trade associations, was very happy, while offerors privately expressed frustration, if not outrage, with offeror
process) (statement of Professor Hamilton) [hereinafter cited as 1977 House Oversight Hearings];
HousE OFFEROR REPORT, supra note 70 (Congressional criticism of offeror process); telephone in·
terview with John McLaughlin, Counsel, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Jan. 28, 1985) (nobody, including offerors and CPSC
attorneys and staff, "had anything good to say" when Congress considered abolition).
80. See 42 Fed. Reg. 15,711 (1977).

Number4]

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

1115

reimbursement. 81 In November, the Commission responded by granting
the petition and contracting for an independent study of the concept. 82
During March 1977, the Consumer Product Safety Commission relied
upon implied power to propose a demonstration compensation program
applicable to informal rulemaking. 83 In May 1978, however, the agency
adopted an "interim" rule and announced it would entertain case-by-case
applications for initiatives not included therein. 84 Thereafter, the Consumer Product Safety Commission reimbursed many parties to perform a
number of tasks.
During June 1978, the Commission agreed to work with the Chain
Saw Manufacturers Association (CSMA) on a consumer product safety
standard for chain saws. The contract between the Consumer Product
Safety Commission and the Chain Saw Manufacturers Association provided for public involvement and agency payment of "certain consumer
representatives," so the CSMA and citizens who assisted the Association
could be viewed as funded participants. The Commission paid one person for speaking at a December 1978 meeting held to ascertain the perspectives of manufacturers and others on the hazards of cigarette ignition
of upholstered furniture. During late 1979, three consumer groups were
reimbursed for responding to an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking information on consumer products containing asbestos and
potential schemes for regulating its sources. In the winter of 1979-1980,
the Consumer Product Safety Commission compensated numerous persons who testified on possible health effects from exposure to urea formaldehyde foam insulation (UFFI). Between 1980 and 1982, the
Commission funded seven individuals to aid the agency's technical staff
in developing a citizens band (CB) omnidirectional antenna standard.
In January 1977, the commissioners voted to create an Office of Public
Participation. The principal responsibility of the Office was to manage
the reimbursement effort instituted pursuant to implied authority. 85 Because the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) disagreed over specifics relating to the director of the
unit, such as the government service rating to be assigned that individ81. See
82. See
83. See
84. See
85. See

id.
id.; CPSC EXTERNAL STUDY, supra note 61.
42 Fed. Reg. 15,711 (1977).
43 Fed. Reg. 23,560 (1978).
id.; 42 Fed. Reg. 15,711, 15,715-16 (1977).
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ual, 86 the Office did not become fully operational until shortly before
Congress effectively ended compensation at the Commission by proscribing funding under implied power. 87 That prohibition has been repeated
yearly since 1980, 88 and in 1982, the agency suspended the effort initiated
under implied authority. 89 Congress also substantially decreased the
Consumer Product Safety Commission's budget in 1981 90 and has increased minimally the appropriation since that time. 91 The fiscal constraints thus imposed may well have eliminated anyway the
compensation program initiated under implied power, and the financial
strictures may explain the agency's failure to invoke the funding authority specifically granted in 1981. 92

3.

Prior Studies

There have been quite a few assessments of compensated citizen involvement at the Consumer Product Safety Commission; however, none
has closely analyzed the effectiveness of reimbursed activity in all the
proceedings. The external study commissioned by the Consumer Product Safety Commission did not treat quality or impact. 93 A 1976 Comptroller General's report mentioned the slow pace of agency work on toy
hazards. 94 Two law students only evaluated the quality and efficacy of
three groups' written comments in the asbestos rulemaking. 95 The Consumer Product Safety Commission's internal assessment selectively examined compensated participation in several initiatives where it seemed
86. See 43 Fed. Reg. 23,560 (1978) (rank to be assigned director); cf. CPSC Public Participa·
tion File (discussion of CPSC-CSC disagreements).
87. The Office became fully operational in October 1979. Congress ended compensation a year
later. See 126 CONG. REc. Sl3084 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1980).
88. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
89. See 47 Fed. Reg. 12,789 (1982).
90. Compare Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appro·
priations Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-101, 95 Stat. 1417, 1423 (1981) ($33 million appropriation) with
Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1981,
Pub. L. No. 96-526, 94 Stat. 3044, 3050 ($43 million appropriation).
91. The budget was $33 million in 1982, $35 million in 1983, and $36 million in 1984 and 1985.
See Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Acts,
1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986, Pub. L. Nos. 97-272; 98-45; 98-371; and 99-160; 96 Stat. 1160, 1166; 97
Stat. 219, 225; 98 Stat. 1213, 1221; and 99 Stat. 909, 915.
92. See supra notes 70-74, 83-84, 87-89 and accompanying text.
93. See CPSC EXTERNAL STUDY, supra note 61; supra note 82 and accompanying text.
94. See REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GEN., BETJ'ER ENFORCEMENT OF
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS NEEDED BY THE CPSC, H.R. Doc. No. 76-148, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1113, 19-20 (1976) [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER'S REPORT].
95. See Stellato & Wright, supra note 64, at 18-21.
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helpful, 96 but the report was prepared chiefly as an advocacy document. 97 I have even more selectively attempted to analyze funded involvement. 98 Moreover, there is surprisingly little Congressional
testimony, especially in contrast to that regarding reimbursed activity at
the Federal Trade Commission and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration which operated the two other most ambitious compensation programs in government. 99
In sum, fourteen agencies have exercised specific or implied power to
underwrite participation of approximately 500 non-commercial individuals and groups in approximately 100 administrative proceedings since
1972. The Consumer Product Safety Commission reimbursed many of
these parties for performing numerous functions in eleven initiatives held
between 1974 and 1982. Little of this government-supported activity has
been evaluated carefully. It is appropriate, therefore, to attempt to assess
rigorously the quality and impact on Commission decisionmaking of
funded involvement in CPSC matters. That effort is undertaken in the
next part of this Article.
96. See CPSC Study, supra note 59.
97. See supra text between notes 59 and 60. Cf. Tobias, supra note 2, at 945 (less documentation of negative funding experience, "because agencies, seeking to secure continued congressional
support, have no interest in emphasizing program shortfalls").
98. See id. at§ IV.A.
99. See, e.g., S. 104 Hearings, supra note 33; H.R. 3361 Hearings, supra note 67. There is,
however, much indirect testimony on funded participation at the CPSC provided in the context of
reauthorization, oversight or appropriations hearings. See, e.g., 1977 House Oversight Hearings,
supra note 79.
There are also evaluations of the off'eror process. See Note, supra note 76 (architectural glazing);
OFFICE OF PROGRAM PLANNING AND EVALUATION, CPSC, EVALUATION OF 0FFEROR PROCESS
(Nov. 5, 1976) (CPSC, olferor work in first four proceedings); COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S.,
THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY CoMMISSION NEEDS TO ISSUE SAFETY STANDARDS FASTER
(Dec. 12, 1977) (CPSC management of process); HOUSE OFFEROR REPORT, supra note 70 (same);
1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 79 (Congressional testimony on process and seven proceedings); Schwartz, supra note 68 (ACUS consultant's comprehensive evaluation of the CPSC, offeror work in lawn mower proceeding and summary analysis of citizen, olferor work in several
others). Cf. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory
Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (1978) (ACUS consultant's
evaluation of the CPSC, olferor work in several proceedings in context of broader study); Meeting on
Consumer Participation in Section 7 Proceedings, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 6, 1975) (participants'
observations on consumer involvement in first olferor proceedings).
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ANALYSIS OF THE QUALITY AND EFFICACY OF REIMBURSED
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION

A. A Word About Methodology
Evaluation of the quality and effectiveness of government sponsored
non-industry participation is problematic. The principal difficulties encountered in performing this study and the treatment of those complications are examined in the following discussion of the methodology. 100
1.

What to Analyze

I chose to evaluate reimbursed involvement at the Consumer Product
Safety Commission for a number of reasons. 101 Single agency analysis
afforded important benefits, such as permitting in-depth investigation of
funded participation throughout the decisional process in numerous initiatives. Moreover, such analysis enabled me to acquire sufficient famili100. The methodology is different in several important respects from, although similar in some
ways to, the approach I used previously. The approach I employed in the past is explained in To·
bias, supra note 2, at § IV. Although I concluded that participant funding was consistent with
agencies' substantive legislative mandates, the approach was selective, because I sought examples of
funded participation's efficacy that would illustrate whether it was consistent with statutory man·
dates. The analysis, therefore, focused on compensated involvement that was particularly effective
or ineffective; I eschewed reliance upon activity in the "middle range," which, of course, comprises
the vast majority of funded participation. See supra notes 66, 98 and accompanying text. The con·
struct I used was a chronological composite of the decisional process for the most comprehensive
proceedings in which funded participation occurred. In the evaluation below, I have attempted to
assess as much compensated activity as possible, regardless of its efficacy, throughout as much of the
decisional processes as possible in all proceedings of one agency. Cf. infra remainder of § II.A. of
this Article (comparing and contrasting of methodologies employed and discussion of approach used
here). As before, I rely substantially upon Boyer, supra notes 14, 62; Rosenbaum, Policy Impacts,
National Symposium on Citizen Participation (Feb. 4, 1980), in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: MODELS
AND METHODS OF EVALUATION 30 (N. Rosenbaum ed. 1980) (published by Center for Responsive
Governance); Rosener, Citizen Participation: Can We Measure Its Effectiveness?, 38 Pua. Ao. REV.
457 (1978).
101. The input of individuals and the submissions of offerors in the seven offeror proceedings
could be considered funded activity, and evaluated, in this Article. But I rejected this possibility
principally because the input differs significantly from the compensated participation analyzed. See
supra notes 69-70, 75-79 and accompanying text. I also rejected at the outset the ideal approach-an
evaluation of all funded activity that occurred. See supra §§ I.A.4; I.B.2 of this Article. The sheer
magnitude of that task was overwhelming; resource and time constraints currently preclude con·
ducting a government-wide assessment with sufficient stringency to make it worthwhile. See supra
§ I.A.4 of this Article (magnitude evidenced by 14 agencies, 500 funded participants, 100 proceed·
ings); Tobias, supra note 2, at 941 n.204 (cost estimates for conducting analyses); remainder of
§ II.A of this Article (stringency). Cf. supra note 62 and accompanying text (ACUS consultant in
four-year FfC study rigorously evaluated funded participation in one proceeding).

Number4]

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

1119

arity with a specific governmental entity to draw relatively informed
conclusions about the reimbursed activity assessed. 102 But this approach
did have disadvantages and involve trade-offs. 103 Thus, although evaluation of compensated involvement at one agency is not ideal, it seemed
preferable. 104
I selected the Consumer Product Safety Commission because its funding experience offered numerous special benefits. The agency paid a
broad variety of participants 105 to perform many tasks 106 in diverse administrative contexts 107 and experimented with the reimbursement concept over a lengthy, continuous period. 108 Moreover, the Consumer
Product Safety Commission had comprehensive, accessible data on initiatives in which compensated activity occurred, 109 had responsive
employees 110 and had received considerable assessment. 111 The Commis102. It is very difficult to become familiar with an agency's peculiarities of form and substance
such as statutory schemes, perspectives on compensation, operating procedures and data retrieval
systems, especially so as to formulate perceptive judgments. See infra § 11.A.2.b of this Article.
Moreover, single agency analysis avoids, or at least minimizes the significance of, certain problems
entailed in evaluating multiple governmental components, such as ascertaining which funded activity to analyze. See infra note 103.
103. For example, there are certain ways that funded activity at a particular unit could serve as a
microcosm for government-wide compensated participation. Such analysis, however, may not necessarily yield telling insights about inter-agency, much less intra-governmental, quality or efficacy.
Indeed, achieving "representativeness" is difficult with any selective approach. See supra note 100.
Although the CPSC"s experience with funded participation may not be representative of government-wide funded activity, the decision to study one agency does afford the advantage of close evaluation of all compensated involvement that occurred there as well as other benefits. See infra notes
105-12 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
105. For example, the CPSC funded individual lay and technical participants, including homemakers, students, physicians, engineers; trade associations; and national consumer groups.
106. For example, participants developed mandatory standards, submitted written comments on
CPSC proposals, conducted product testing and consumer surveys, and testified about their experiences using products.
107. These included notice-comment rulemakings, quasi-adjudicatory proceedings, and public
hearings.
108. The CPSC experimented for nine years, most of its existence. As to all the footnotes in this
sentence, see supra § I.B.2 and infra § 11.B of this Article.
109. See infra§ 11.A.2.c of this Article. The CPSC had data both on the proceedings and on the
participation.
110. Employees were responsive both to requests for data and their opinions of quality and efficacy. This was especially true of those in the Office of the Secretary (OS), who maintain the CPSC's
files and the Office of Public Participation. Those familiar with substantive initiatives in which
funded activity occurred also were very cooperative.
111. See supra § l.B.3 of this Article.
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sion also provided certain less important advantages. 112 However, the
agency did not surpass all governmental components in every respect. 113
Nevertheless, the CPSC afforded a number of benefits and posed no more
problems than any other single agency, thus making it an appropriate
choice for evaluation.

2. How to Analyze
a. Definition of Terms
Effectiveness, impact, and efficacy, words used interchangeably, can be
defined in several ways. The idea of "winning," which emphasizes the
relationship between funded entities' views and administrative decisions,
entails numerous pragmatic difficulties. 114 A less extreme approach, and
the one employed here, is to consider whether reimbursed activity beneficially affected the decisional process. 115 For instance, did the funded input require agency officials to treat constructively questions at issue, even
if specific suggestions were not included in their ultimate choices? The
technique is workable and fair and affords perspectives on compensated
involvement throughout the decisionmaking process, rather than emphasizing end results. It is also a moderate, yet sufficiently demanding, approach that requires less than a cause-effect relationship, as does
"winning," but more than quality performance. Quality, the idea of how
good the funded participation was, is insufficiently rigorous and too subjective to serve as the sole measure.11 6 The factors considered do not
denigrate quality; quality is simply another valuable analytical parameter
which will be used. 117 Quality is as problematic as efficacy but it impli112. For example, CPSC employees seemed to have more accurate recollections of funded activity than those at other agencies. Cf supra note 109 and accompanying text (CPSC data thorough
and accessible). CPSC funding activity also was somewhat less "politically volatile." See, e.g.,
Boyer, supra note 14 (FfC).
113. For instance the FTC spent "as much as $500,000 for fees and expenses in one year,"
Tobias, supra note 2, at 953 n.271, and may have been analyzed more rigorously, cf. supra note 62
and accompanying text (rigorous analysis); 45 Fed. Reg. 2307 (1980) (ACUS recommendation on
FTC funding); supra note 40 (intra-agency analysis). Similarly, the NHTSA's compensation program was nearly as ambitious as the CPSC's. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Moreover,
some of the CPSC's funded activity happened more than 10 years ago.
114. It is difficult to ascertain the views of funded parties, their reasons for adopting these views,
and the effects of their advocacy upon the final agency determinations. For helpful treatment, see B.
BOYER, supra note 62, at 133-34, 138.
115. I used a similar approach in another study. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 940 n.202.
116. Quality lacks rigor, because it does not necessarily account for the effect of funded input on
the decisional process. See B. BOYER, supra note 62, at 136.
117. See infra §§ 11.B; III.A.I, 2 of this Article.
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cates the "substantive validity of the positions advocated" and how they
were asserted. 118

b.

Measurement of Impact

A related complication is the measurement of impact, especially the
causal relationship between reimbursed activity and administrative determination. An important difficulty is discerning exactly what postions
compensated parties were espousing. 119 Even if the perspectives could be
identified conclusively, and were reflected in the agency judgment, it
would be impossible to ascertain definitively whether the input influenced
the choice. "For example, the ultimate administrative determination
might be attributable to the advocacy of other participants or to factors
unrelated to the record made." 120

c.

Sources

There are several complex questions regarding sources of information
on the quality and efficacy of funded involvement. I attempted to examine, collect, and report as much material as practicable and to be representative where constraints existed. I initially identified potential data
sources, finding fifteen studies, forty congressional hearings, 121 Consumer
Product Safety Commission "files," 122 and several thousand people familiar with the reimbursed activity. 123 Because the studies were few and
brief and the testimony seemed important, I read each study and hearing.
I read the index to every file, and, whenever I located a reference related
to compensated participation, I examined the document. 124 All relevant
allusions to quality or efficacy in studies, hearings, or files, regardless of
118. See B. BOYER, supra note 62, at 136.
119. For a helpful analysis of the problem, see id. at 133-34, 138.
120. Tobias, supra note 2, at 941 n.203. Cf B. BOYER, supra note 62, at 134-36; Rosenbaum,
supra note 100, at 46-47 (additional treatment of cause-effect).
121. As to the studies, all of which are less than 150 pages, see supra§ I.B.3 of this Article. The
hearings consist principally of House and Senate appropriations, reauthorization, and oversight
hearings. See, e.g.. 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 79.
122. These files, which appear to include nearly all data gathered by the CPSC, are available at
the CPSC's Office of Secretary, 5401 Westbard, Bethesda, Md.
123. This is a crude, but conservative, estimate based on all the work I performed. See infra
notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
124. I did not read entire files, because some included 15,000 pages, and the effort did not appear
cost-beneficial. Cf B. BOYER, supra note 62, at 133 (opinions of informed observers may be best
available data); telephone interview with Barry B. Boyer (Nov. 24, 1981) (interviews generally more
valuable than record examination).
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reliability, are reportea in the next subsection of this Article. 125 This
approach affords many benefits, such as the transmission of considerable
raw data, free of value choices. 126 But concerns about the dependability
of the material required consideration of the other principal data
source. 127
Treating individuals familiar with funded involvement was more problematic. One complication is the large number who appeared sufficiently
knowledgeable to offer plausible opinions. Therefore, a selective approach was indicated. 128 Another difficulty is that nearly everyone familiar with reimbursed participation had some stake in the outcome of the
proceeding in which that activity occurred and, concomitantly, in the
perceived quality and efficacy of such involvement. 129 I addressed this
difficulty with a methodology premised on balance in terms of perspectives and numbers, soliciting the opinions of a large, equal number of
people from the three major categories of knowledgeable protagonists:
agency, regulated and non-commercial interests. 130 The approach is
125. See infra § 11.B of this Article.
126. I tried to serve as a conduit, so that readers could use the data reported in § 11.B of this
Article to draw conclusions as I did in § III of this Article. Examination of all this data affords
obvious benefits, such as informing my judgments about issues in proceedings and, ultimately, about
efficacy. Reading in the files what funded parties said or wrote offered special advantages in terms of
accuracy. Indeed, the actual input often was "strikingly different" from the impressions gleaned
from "reviewing secondary sources [and] interviewing observers." See infra text between notes 378
and 379.
127. One such concern was the considerable potential for bias. See, e.g., supra notes 59·60, 67
and accompanying text. This, and other concerns, meant that the material could not be relied upon
exclusively.
128. As to numbers, see supra text accompanying note 123. Even if I could have interviewed all
potential sources, other constraints, such as space limitations and reader interest, would have precluded the reproduction of all such interviews.
129. Thus, the fundamental problems are to secure maximum accuracy in terms of knowledge
and to minimize potential bias.
130. There were obviously others, such as members of Congress. Moreover, interests within
each of the three major categories could not always be "pigeonholed." But I was able to identify four
principal groups of people affiliated with the CPSC: (1) technical staff with substantive responsibility
for proceedings; (2) personnel responsible for the participant funding program; (3) attorneys responsible for proceedings or the compensation effort; and (4) the commissioners.
I found the people in the first and third groups to be the most reliable, although the need of all
these sources to defend the decisions reached in the proceedings could have skewed their views on
funded involvement. However, that consideration and the other possibilities for bias are tempered
because nearly all the initiatives have been completed, the compensation endeavor has been discontinued, and many agency personnel are no longer associated with the CPSC.
The second primary category consisted of lawyers and technical experts employed by three major
categories of representatives from regulated industry: (1) large manufacturers; (2) small businesses;
and (3) trade associations. Their roles as proponents of positions different from, and frequently
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meant to provide assurance against error attributable to lack of objectivity by affording certain statistical validity and opportunities for comparing the ideas expressed.13 1
I conducted the interviews as follows. I gleaned sources primarily
from the Consumer Product Safety Commission files and those individuals contacted. 132 I sought views by telephone-I identified myself, explained what I was doing, asked the nature of sources' involvement in the
agency's initiatives and their opinions of the funded input's quality and
impact, and recorded what was said. 133 In reporting the information, I
reproduced verbatim or paraphrased below all pertinent references, regardless of apparent reliability. This methodology provided certain advantages, especially the promise of accuracy. The approach did not
eliminate bias or unfamiliarity, but rather acknowledged the existence of
those factors and attempted to allow for them. 134 The technique also
permitted me to assemble inexpensively much raw data, while it afforded
me the advantages of oral communication. 135 Moreover, the methodology facilitated transmission of that material, which, when considered in
conjunction with the approach's explanation, should enable readers to
formulate their own judgments regarding accuracy.
A final vexing problem was how to use this information to draw conadverse to, the views of funded parties and their perception that those receiving reimbursement
lacked technical expertise and unnecessarily delayed proceedings made the manufacturers representatives seem less objective than might have been appropriate.
Non-funded and reimbursed individuals and consumer group representatives who had experience
using the product or technical or legal expertise comprised the third principal category. For obvious
reasons, compensated participants might evaluate funded activity more positively than they should.
Even uncompensated participants, however, could be similarly disposed, given the congruence between their views and the perspectives of those who were reimbursed on the desirability of compensation and on the substantive issues.
131. The approach affords opportunities for comparison across, and within, the three categories
mentioned and two disciplines-technical and legal. Moreover, the approach facilitates detection of
error attributable to lack of knowledge. I also sought the views of some funded non-technical participants involved in most proceedings and as many commissioners as feasible, even though these
observers might have lacked sufficient detachment or knowledge. I did so, because (1) they are so
integral, as actual compensated participants, or ultimate decisionmakers, to this assessment; and (2)
any prejudice or unfamiliarity can be detected in several ways. See infra notes 141-44.
132. Of course, given the large number of potential sources, see supra note 123 and accompanying text, those contacted had to be "cut off" at some point. This was done pursuant to the guidance
in the paragraph immediately above.
133. Quality and efficacy were defined as above supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 127-31; infra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text. One obvious benefit is the ability to clarify
ideas expressed.

1124

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 64:1101

clusions about quality and efficacy. 136 For each proceeding, I reviewed
all the data accumulated. 137 I began with the compensated input 138 and
attempted to reach a preliminary determination by considering it and all
data not directly expressing opinions. This exercise rarely yielded dispositive ·conclusions, 139 but it did help me make determinations by informing my assessments of the opinions that I examined next. I read all
opinions of quality and impact and attempted to assign them values
based on accuracy, in terms of objectivity and knowledge. I employed
several considerations. One factor involved a "theoretical" judgment,
premised on the source's ability to inspire trust. 140 Another set of considerations was "intangible," such as my sense of a source's perceptivity. 141 I also relied upon other, more pragmatic, factors. I compared the
opinions with data that did not express views and contrasted the opinions
across, and within, each category and subcategory of the studies, hearings, files and interviews. 142 I adjusted the "scores" assigned initially
when the information considered as a whole warranted modification.
One device used was the concept of balance. 143 A second, less exact
mechanism was consensus, especially that not attributable to community
of interest. 144 Because this methodology was imprecise and had other
136. See infra § III of this Article.
137. This includes data reported in the next subsection and that gathered but not reported, such
as information on the underlying substantive issues. See infra § III of this Article.
138. The written comments submitted in several rulemakings provide an example. Most of the
funded input is in the CPSC's files. See supra notes 122, 124 and accompanying text.
139. Dispositive conclusions were possible in some situations. For example, such conclusions
could be drawn ifthe preamble to a CPSC regulation stated that funded input actually had affected a
specific decision.
140. Sources inspired trust, either by virtue of perceived capacity for detachment in terms of
neutrality or independence, as manifested by the absence of any stake in the funded activity, or
knowledge in terms of insight, as evidenced by proximity to the initiative.
141. This sense of a source's perceptivity, as well as reliability, was derived from interviewing
several hundred people and from working with CPSC employees for 15 months. For example, I
found peculiarly trustworthy sources to be former CPSC staff who are now employed by those
regulated.
142. For instance, reimbursed individuals' actual testimony during several public meetings was
quite different from observers' later impressions of it. See, e.g., infra § II.B.5, 8. I found this a
surprisingly helpful "check." See supra note 126. Although actual funded input is the classic example, I also relied on material in CPSC files and additional sources like Federal Register preambles.
143. For example, views of funded citizens and industry representatives originally given low
values because of potential for bias were upgraded if the detrimental aspects of the views could have
been minimized by offsetting the opinions or comparing and contrasting them with perspectives of
ostensibly neutral observers, like CPSC technical staff. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
144. For instance, when several industry employees, two funded parties, three staffers, one commissioner, and an extra-agency evaluator agreed, their views received greater weight than each
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limitations, 145 I attempted to refine the ratings by applying more qualitative, subjective factors, such as my perception of the dynamics that operated in particular proceedings. 146 Finally, I made "gestalt" judgments
formed while engaging in the entire enterprise.
This approach afforded considerable assurance of accuracy. The technique offered some mathematical certainty and objectivity but permitted
the exercise of discretion and a certain amount of subjectivity. Moreover, this methodology had many elements which served as checks and
balances.
3.

Miscellaneous Considerations

The methodological difficulties examined seem most important and
problematic. But there are others, most of which were mentioned.
Three significant, related ones-when and where to assess and who
should analyze-warrant more theoretical, and less textual, treatment
because they are limited severely by real pragmatic constraints. Thus,
they will be explored briefly here and below. 147
The timing of evaluation involves several difficult issues. Now that
funding effectively has been discontinued and considerable time has
passed since much reimbursed participation occurred, it may seem inappropriate to assess the activity. But these factors, and others, actually
make the present a good time. 148 A question implicating similar issues is
would have received individually. Of course, this idea implicates the concept of balance, see supra
note 143 and accompanying text, and could skew results if not numerically similar, see supra note
130 and accompanying text.
145. For example, it lacks statistical validity and certain advantages that more "rigorous" evaluation would afford. See infra § IV of this Article.
146. For example, if an industry were divided over a CPSC proposal, specific producers might
view funded activity differently than they would if they were united. See, e.g., infra § Il.B. 7 of this
Article.
147. The crucial pragmatic constraint is that little now can be done to alter their treatment. Cf.
infra § IV of this Article (future possibilities).
148. The recent suspension of citizen funding, which always was controversial, and even has
been described as "politically volatile," see Harter, supra note 79, at 56; accord Boyer, supra note 14,
should mean that current analysis would be attended less by political pressures and ought to permit
calmer reflection, by eliminating temporal constraints and by making reimbursed involvement much
less of a "moving target." Passage of time is a mixed blessing. Some proceedings in which compensated activity occurred were completed only recently. For earlier ones, I found that temporal distance yielded considerable objectivity, memories of persons familiar with funded participation
remained surprisingly accurate, and most relevant data remained readily accessible. There was, of
course, some loss of accuracy, both in terms of memory lapses and data availability, which contemporaneous evaluation would have minimized. The most obvious memory lapses were revealed by the
discrepancies between certain observers' recollections of funded input and its actual nature. See

1126

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 64: 1101

where to evaluate. When the compensated input was an oral contribution, being present would have offered benefits, like securing impressions
of credibility. 149 However such attendance would have been prohibitively expensive, 150 and it did not happen and cannot occur now. What
is possible and seems next best is the approach used here. 151 A third
question is who should perform the assessment. That person ought to
possess (1) sufficient familiarity with the funding concept and techniques
of analysis, agency initiatives in which reimbursed participation occurred, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission and (2) adequate
detachment to render the most accurate account. Although many, especially people affiliated with the Commission, know more about the
agency than I do, 152 I have worked on the compensation idea for a decade. 153 Accordingly, the reader can weigh my familiarity with funding
and the CPSC as well as my potential for bias.
Another issue involves priorities, especially depth, breadth, scope, and
detail of analysis. I attempted to assess as much compensated participation, as rigorously as I could, employing the touchstone of accuracy. But
I did make the choices above. I also made judgments about the relative
supra note 126. But the "checks" enumerated above compensated for most of these. Moreover,
most of the data gathered at the CPSC seem essentially intact. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Furthermore, that type of analysis was a luxury which could rarely be afforded, and was
infrequently performed, even at the apogee of funding activity, and obviously cannot be done now.
Thus, on balance, the present appears to be a reasonably appropriate time.
149. Another advantage would be the opportunity to secure impressions of the dynamics generally operating. Both examples implicate issues similar to appellate court or agency treatment of factfinding performed by trial judges, juries, or AIJs. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREA·
TISE, §§ 29.22, 29.26 (1984); W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, HANDBOOK ON TORTS, § 37 (5th ed.
1984).
150. For example, the chain saw proceeding involved many meetings held in numerous cities.
See infra § 11.B.7 of this Article. Cf supra note 101 (cost estimates of evaluating funded activity).
151. That is to read what actually was said as well as to interview those people who said it and
anyone else who could provide an accurate account of the funded involvement. Locus also was
important to conducting interviews. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text. Interviewing
analysts of compensated participation in person, like personal observation of oral input in proceedings, affords certain advantages, such as increased ability to render credibility judgments, but the
cost is substantial. Therefore, because interviewing by telephone affords numerous benefits similar to
in-person interviews, and the additional advantages of securing more opinions and cost efficiency, it
seemed preferable.
152. A number, however, might lack the requisite objectivity. See supra note 130. Thus, an
extra-agency evaluator, but one sufficiently familiar with the CPSC funded involvement, appeared
preferable.
153. I did so in part as an FDA consultant, in which capacity I had some responsibility for
implementing the funding program now discontinued. See supra notes 47, 55 and accompanying
text.
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significance of reimbursed activity at the CPSC, guided by considerations, such as how important the involvement was to the proceeding in
which it occurred or how representative that participation was vis-a-vis
other activity at the Commission or additional agencies. 154
There are numerous other complications that impair stringent evaluation. 155 Although I recognize the methodology used here does not satisfy
all the standards of "rigor" I prescribe in the final section of this Article
for those conducting future analyses, "every study has its limits-and
this one is no exception." 156 The decision to assess all of the compensated
involvement at the Consumer Product Safety Commission is defensible
and realistic, given present resource constraints, the dearth of reliable
scrutiny to date, and the current availability of relevant information. 157
It is also important to begin systematically (1) gathering data on funded
participation before it becomes less accessible or is forgotten, lost or destroyed and (2) analyzing the material assembled to ascertain whether
more conclusive determinations about quality and efficacy can be
reached. 158 This study is a start; I invite and challenge others to criticize
it and to (1) evaluate reimbursed activity at the remaining units of government, (2) contrast those agencies' experiences, (3) attempt to draw the
154. For example, five minutes of funded testimony in the upholstered-furniture proceeding,
which was begun in 1977 and is ongoing, warranted, and was accorded, less scrutiny than other
CPSC funded activity. See infra § 11.B.8 of this Article.
155. For helpful treatment of many such complications, see B. BOYER, supra note 62, at 134-38;
Rosenbaum, supra note 100; Rosener, supra note 100. Cf infra§ IV of this Article (suggestions for
future evaluation).
156. See Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 362 n.15.
157. The data, while becoming increasingly difficult to secure, remain sufficient to permit more
rigorous analysis than has been undertaken thus far. The assessment of the CPSC also yielded interesting insights as to reimbursed and unfunded public participation at other governmental entities,
the advisability of discontinuing the CPSC's program, the CPSC's decisionmaking and the broader
administrative process, the Commission itself, and techniques for evaluating compensated activity.
For a discussion of reimbursed and unfunded participation, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 945 n.288
and accompanying text. Conclusions regarding most of these ideas are in §§ 111.A.4, IV of this
Article.
158. Funded activity may have numerous impacts that pertain less directly to the decisional
process, such as increased public confidence in agency decisions. See Furrow, Governing Science:
Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1422-24 (1983). Although these impacts are important, their thorough consideration is beyond the scope of this paper. Cf PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION STUDY, supra note 9; NRC REPORT, supra note 61; Boyer, supra note 14; Cramton,
supra note 6; Gellhorn, supra note 5; Note, supra note 4 (discussion of many impacts). Of course,
administration of funding programs is also important. But the ACUS, Professor Boyer and I have
concluded that the difficulties are not so problematic as to prohibit funding. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.79-5
(1987); B. BOYER, supra note 62, at 113-14; Tobias, supra note 2, at 952. Cf infra § III.A.4 of this
Article (suggestions for program administration).
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increasingly definitive judgments regarding quality and impact that aggregate assessment should permit, 159 and (4) improve evaluative
techniques. 160
B.

Proceeding-Specific Analysis

For each initiative in which compensated involvement occurred, there
will be a descriptive analysis of the proceeding as well as verbatim or
paraphrased opinions, and my conclusions, about quality or efficacy. For
ease of analysis, the funded activity essentially will be examined
chronologically.
1.

Fireworks

In May 1974, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, under authority transferred to it by the Federal Hazardous Substances Act
(FHSA), announced its intention to adopt a 1973 proposal of the FDA
imposing restrictions on fireworks. 161 Objections by members of the industry and the state of Hawaii postponed the date on which the proposed
controls were to have become effective while triggering additional agency
consideration of potential regulation. 162 Public hearings before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who was the initial decisionmaker, were
159. The study does not purport to resolve the issue of funded participation's effect on administrative decisionmaking. Insofar as available evidence permits, however, I attempt to draw more
definitive judgments than those found in past studies.
160. See infra § IV of this Article. Of course, the reader who lacks the time or interest to read
all the data reported next may read it selectively or read the conclusions I draw in § III. The
selective reader might read about one, or several, proceedings, choosing different types. For a discussion of the difficulties entailed in reading some or no data, see supra notes 100, 102-03, 125-26
and accompanying text.
To preserve, insofar as possible, the confidentiality of the CPSC, its members and staff, funded
participants and the other people whom I interviewed, I identified most of those people only by
numerical designations. This journal's editors have relied upon me to verify the accuracy of information reported below. Most interviews were conducted during 1983 and 1984. Any inquiries
regarding the sources should be directed to me. Copies of all non-confidential sources cited in the
Article are in the CPSC's files or other public documents.
161. See 39 Fed. Reg. 17,435 (1974); 15 U.S.C. § 2079(a) (1982) (§ 30(a) of CPSA) (FHSA
authority). Cf. 39 Fed. Reg. 17,435-44 (prior history offireworks regulation, CPSC modification of
FDA's proposal in light of public comment, and restrictions CPSC intended to impose).
162. See id. at 25,473. Postponement and additional consideration were mandated by 21 U.S.C.
§ 37l(e) (1976) because the CPSC intended to impose a ban under the FHSA. Cf. 41 Fed. Reg.
9512-23 (1976); Feinberg, Consumer Product Safety: The Current Record of Administrative Inter·
pretation, 37 FED. B. J. 56, 64-66 (1978) (discussion of these requirements and proceeding's
background).
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to be held in Washington, D.C., 163 but, when sessions also were sched-

uled for Kansas City, Missouri, and Honolulu, Hawaii, the commissioners authorized the ALJ to fund the rule's proponents should their
involvement be necessary to secure an adequate record. 164 The Administrative Law Judge then awarded compensation to the counsel for the
Health Research Group (HRG), the selected representative of a conglomerate of public interest organizations, which included entities such
as the National Society for the Prevention of Blindness. 165 The most
controversial question at issue in the proceeding was whether fireworks
should be banned. The interests represented by the Health Research
Group favored stringent controls, arguing for the imposition of a ban on
all fireworks products, but submitted evidence supporting strict regulation if proscription were deemed unacceptable. The position of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, participating as a party in the
initiative, was more moderate and closer to the perspective of the regulated industry, although the agency advocated a ban on firecrackers. 166
After hearing twenty-one days of testimony, the Administrative Law
Judge issued summary conclusions and a narrative decision in April
1975. 167 The commissioners modified many of the determinations made
by the Administrative Law Judge and published a tentative order in
March 1976 168 and a final rule in June. 169 That final regulation, which
included a compromise on the ban question resembling the views espoused by the CPSC during the hearing, 170 was sustained on appeal. 171
One lawyer responsible for the agency's case said that, although it was
difficult to document the cause-and-effect contribution of the Health Re163. See 39 Fed. Reg. 36,041 (1974); FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM, H.

Doc. No. 34 (13187-3), 95th Cong., !st Sess. 221 (1977).
164. See sources cited supra note 163.
165. See 41 Fed. Reg. 9512, 9513 (1976). Conglomerate members also included the American
Public Health Association and many others, most of which are listed at id.
166. See id. at 9512-23; telephone interviews with CPSC employee 1; David Masselli, HRG
counsel. See generally Feinberg, supra note 162, at 64-65 (more background discussion).
167. See 41 Fed. Reg. 9512, 9514 (1976). Cf. Feinberg, supra note 162, at 65 (additional discussion of proceeding).
168. See 41 Fed. Reg. 9512 et seq. (1976).
169. See id. at 22,931 (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1507). Cf. Feinberg, supra note 162, at 65-66
(additional discussion of proceeding).
170. See telephone interviews, supra note 166.
171. See National Society for the Prevention of Blindness v. CPSC, 566 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied sub nom. Hawaii v. CPSC, 435 U.S. 943 (1978). Cf. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,873 (1977)
(substance of unreported opinion above): see generally id. 41 Fed. Reg. 22,931-33 (1976); Feinberg,
supra note 162, at 66 (additional discussion of proceeding).
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search Group, 172 he was impressed by the entity's input. The attorney
for the Health Research Group was intelligent and aggressive, submitted
substantiated information that would not otherwise have been available,
and made thorough, effective factual presentations and legal arguments.
That input, which required consideration of new ideas, kept the Commission "staff honest and on its toes," forcing them to rely less on industry,
provided evidence to support more stringent controls than might have
been imposed and improved the administrative record. 173 Co-counsel for
the Consumer Product Safety Commission thought that the lawyer for
the Health Research Group "did an excellent job to the extent he participated," conducting "some extremely effective cross-examination." 174
The author of the fireworks opinion issued by the agency agreed with
both attorneys, adding that the work of the funded counsel "had a big
impact on how the case proceeded" and led to a "more balanced result
that was a reasonable solution," albeit more moderate than the position
championed. 175 Two agency technical people were "quite favorably impressed," finding the HRG's lawyer "effective in promoting his cause"
and cross-examining witnesses, although one said all his contentions
were not adopted and the other was unsure of his "effect on the case." 176
The Administrative Law Judge was "not very impressed," stating that
the attorney "did very little, consumed a lot of time, presented no affirmative case, and simply cross-examined." 177 Counsel for the Health Research Group explained that he had argued that his client was not
obligated by the statute to "put on a case which led to friction with the
172. The individual had difficulty for many reasons discussed supra § II.A of this Article, adding
it "would take three months to piece together" the entity's input, an admonition that led me to
interview numerous individuals familiar with the proceeding.
173. See telephone interview with CPSC employee 1, supra note 166. The individual also contrasted this funded input with other funded input, which was characterized as duplicative and unsubstantiated, adding the CPSC "got its money's worth." Id. Cf. infra notes 174-77 and
accompanying text (numerous CPSC employees agreed with much he said and other specific ideas).
174. Telephone interview with CPSC employee 2.
175. Telephone interview with CPSC employee 3. The ALJ was a "very activist judge who was
influenced by people who put on pitches, [i.e.], fireworks types." Id.
176. Telephone interviews with CPSC employees, 4, 5. The first individual also said that the
CPSC's "regulation was pretty effective," as fireworks injuries decreased from 11,400 in 1976 to
8,000 in 1984, while consumption increased 50%. He added, however, that Chinese producers improved the manufacture of 50 mg. firecrackers so they would provide a report two-thirds as loud as
those banned, thus partially defeating the CPSC's intent, and concluded that there "still is a problem
with illegal and bootlegged fireworks, especially M-80's." Id. See infra text accompanying note 181.
177. Telephone interview with Paul Pfeiffer.
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AU." 178 The lawyer added that the Health Research Group found the
Commission's proposal weak in several respects, but the entity at least
wanted to ensure the adoption of the Consumer Product Safety Commission's proposal. 179 He asserted that the HRG's advocacy of positions
more extreme than those of other parties protected the CPSC's approach. 180 The attorney did not claim that the fireworks problem was
solved, or that the Health Research Group "played a major role," but he
asserted that the "post-1975 legal fireworks world is very different," because most injuries today are from illegal M-80's. 181 The rule, unlike
many regulations adopted then, also withstood judicial challenge. Moreover, funded participation was a "taxpayers' bargain," as the counsel for
the Health Research Group worked "1000 hours at two dollars per
hour." 182
2.

Carpet Flammability Enforcement Proceeding

In 1975, the Consumer Product Safety Commission agreed to pay two
respondents charged with violating carpet flammability standards,
should the Administrative Law Judge find that continued prosecution
was warranted and that those accused were indigent. 183 But the need for
funding was obviated when the ALJ determined that pursuit of the matter would not serve the public interest because the respondents had declared bankruptcy and no longer held managerial positions in the
industry, while prosecution would have yielded only a marginal benefit,
even if successful. 184
3.

Toy Safety Public Meeting

In May 1973, the authority to regulate toy safety was transferred to
the Consumer Product Safety Commission from the Food and Drug Administration, which had issued a proposal governing dangers posed to
178. Telephone interview with David Masselli, supra note 166.
179. Id.
180. Id. Cf. B. BOYER, supra note 62, at 132-38 (when participants' positions premised on strategic considerations, it is difficult to ascertain actual views, much less cause-effect relationship between them and decisionmaking).
181. Telephone interview with David Masselli, supra note 166.
182. Id.
183. See Order Authorizing Assignment of Counsel For Individual Respondents Alvin L. Couch
and Power W. Bethea if Justified by Their Indigency Claim, In re Esquire Carpet Mills, Inc., F.T.C.
Docket No. 8913 (1975).
184. See id.
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children by small parts during the preceding February. 185 In January
1975, the Commission proposed rules on hazards presented by sharp
edges and sharp points. 186 Because the Consumer Product Safety Commission wished to acquire the "broadest perspectives" in pursuing solutions to the risks involved, the agency held a public meeting in October
1976 to solicit consumer views on potential regulation. 187 The possibility
of Commission regulation had proceeded slowly because of difficulties in
using generic requirements, defining sharp edges and points, and developing testing procedures. 188 Two citizens received funding. The Consumer Product Safety Commission revised the small-parts proposal in
1978 and finalized it in 1979, while the sharp edges and points proposals
have not become final. 189
One person attended the session but said nothing, and the other commented throughout. 190 An agency lawyer who was present said that the
participating citizen added "zero." 191 Counsel for the Toy Manufacturers of America, Inc. (TMA), who also attended, found that the individual was "vitriolic, extremely critical of all that was done and
ineffective." 192 Although the Commission's Project Manager described
the participant's recommendation that the CPSC "start off subjectively"
in treating balloons 193 as a "good suggestion," the "kind of thing" for
185. See 38 Fed. Reg. 2179 (1973). Cf Toy Manufacturers of America, Inc. v. CPSC, 630 F.2d
70, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1980); infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text (discussion of toy safety regulation background).
186. See 40 Fed. Reg. 1488 (1975).
187. See Transcript, In re Toy Safety Meeting, at 3, Bethesda, Md. (Oct. 19, 1976) (statement of
Albert Dimcolf, CPSC Acting Executive Director).
188. For an analysis of CPSC toy regulation, resulting in recommendations that the CPSC
"promptly issue (1) toy safety requirements that adequately define the hazards associated with toys,
and (2) test procedures," see COMPTROLLER'S REPORT, supra note 94, at 11-13, 19-20. Cf Compli-

ance and Enforcement Efforts of CPSC: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate
Commerce Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1976); Transcript, Toy Safety Meeting, supra note 187,
at 5, 35 (CPSC explanations of difficulties in regulating toys) (statement of John Preston, CPSC Toy
Regulation Project Manager); 40 Fed. Reg. 1488-89, 1491-92 (1975); 44 Fed. Reg. 34,892-93 (1979)
(CPSC toy regulation efforts before meeting); id. at 34,892 et seq.; 43 Fed. Reg. 12,636 et seq. (1978)
(efforts after meeting).
189. See 43 Fed. Reg. 12,636; 44 Fed. Reg. 34,892 (1979), codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1501 (1987).
Cf Toy Manufacturers of America, Inc. v. CPSC, 630 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1980) (unsuccessful industry
trade association judicial challenge to small parts regulation).
190. See Transcript, Toy Safety Meeting, supra note 187.
191. Telephone interview with CPSC employee 1.
192. See telephone interview with industry representative 1.
193. See Transcript, Toy Safety Meeting, supra note 187, at 33-34 (statement of funded participant 2).
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which the agency was looking, and an idea "from the outside world [answering] some of our problems," 194 even it was ultimately rejected. 195
My reading of the participant's input and comparison of it with the Commission's resolution of toy-safety issues confirms the above assessments
and indicates that much contributed by the consumer advocate was not
very analytical or effective and that some was explicitly rejected. 196 In
fairness, the citizen contended that the "deck was stacked against public
involvement," that the Chairman of the Consumer Product Safety Commission "did not want to rock industry's boat," that the attorney for the
Toy Manufacturers of America was the "synthesis of a lobbyist whose
primary concern was toy interests," and that the producers "were not
interested in her help." 197 Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect that a
single party's input would affect a six-year decisional process. 198
4.

Asbestos Patching Compounds

In July 1977, the Consumer Product Safety Commission proposed
banning asbestos-containing patching compounds (APC) because the
agency believed that cancer resulted from inhaling asbestos fibers released during application. 199 In an August hearing, three non-industry
participants and four producers offered specific testimony. 200 Two of the
industry members had discontinued manufacturing APC and another,
Union Carbide, vigorously opposed the proposal.201 An environmental
consultant who had helped two public interest groups petition the Commission on this issue was paid to testify. 202 In December, the agency
banned asbestos patching compounds. 203
An appraisal of the effect of funded input is complicated by the diffi194. See id. (statement of John Preston).
195. See 16 C.F.R. § 1501.3(a) (1987) (balloons' exemption from CPSC regulation covering
small parts).
196. Compare comments of funded participant 2 in Transcript, Toy Safety Meeting, supra note
187, with last two Federal Register documents cited supra note 188.
197. Telephone interview with funded participant 2.
198. Indeed, the Child Protection and Toy Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 91-113, 83 Stat. 187, passed
in 1969 and the small parts rule, 16 C.F.R. § 1501, issued in 1979. Cf supra§ II.A of this Article
(difficulty of assessing such impact).
199. See 42 Fed. Reg. 38,783 (1977). Cf id.; 42 Fed. Reg. 63,354 (1977) (discussion of proceeding's background).
200. See Transcript, Asbestos Patching Compounds, Bethesda, Md. (August 15, 1977).
201. Id.
202. See telephone interview with funded participant. The two groups were the Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).
203. See 42 Fed. Reg. 63,354 (1977).
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culty of estimating one person's impact in a single hearing, when the
Consumer Product Safety Commission seemed predisposed to finalizing
the proposal, only one producer strongly opposed it, and no specific testimony was mentioned in the preamble to the ban. The citizen's presentation seemed more general, historical, anecdotal, and disorganized than
necessary. He only addressed the proposal's substance when admonished
by the Chairman of the Commission to "get to the two hazards which"
were the subject of the meeting and when he was later instructed to summarize. 204 But the Consumer Product Safety Commission implemented
the action the reimbursed individual urged and the agency adopted some
of his specific ideas, such as rejection of a Union Carbide solution. 205 A
staffer thought that the compensated party was "very effective" and that
he provided much helpful written and oral support for the ban. 206 The
paid participant said that he "got much in the record" to assure that the
ban "was not overtumed."207 That effort apparently succeeded because
the Commission decision to ban was not challenged.

5.

Children's Sleepwear

In October 1977, the Consumer Product Safety Commission proposed
to amend flammability standards for children's sleepwear by deleting restrictions governing residual flame time (RFT), exempting small garments, and revising trim-testing methods. 208 The principal purpose of
the Commission proposal was to minimize flame-retardant chemicals in
the clothing while maintaining adequate fire protection. 209 Fifteen parties, one of whom was funded, spoke at a November public meeting. 210
The agency analyzed the oral testimony and 200 written comments. The
Consumer Product Safety Commission omitted the RFT constraints and
modified the trim-testing techniques in February 1978.211
204. For the citizen's presentation, see Transcript, Asbestos Patching Compounds, supra note
200, at 154-75. Cf. id. at 162, 175 (Chairman Simpson's admonition and instructions).
205. See 42 Fed. Reg. 63,354, 63,357, 63,361 (1977) (taking the action urged and rejecting Union
Carbide's solution); cf. Transcript, Asbestos Patching Compounds, supra note 200 (funded partici·
pant's testimony).
206. See telephone interview with CPSC employee I.
207. See telephone interview with funded participant, supra note 202.
208. See 42 Fed. Reg. 56,568 (1977). Cf. id. at 56,568·69 (discussion of proceeding's
background).
209. See id.
210. See Transcript, Public Meeting on Proposed Amendments to Standards for Flammability of
Children's Sleepwear, Bethesda, Md. (Nov. 16, 1977).
211. See 43 Fed. Reg. 4849 (1978), codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1615 (1987).
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It is more problematic to evaluate this consumer's input than the contributions analyzed in the two proceedings discussed immediately above.
The citizen was one of 200 commenters, none of whom was mentioned in
the preamble to the final rule. Many people, including producers, agreed
with the funded individual and favored the proposal. The Consumer
Product Safety Commission appeared predisposed to amend the proposal, as evidenced by the rapid way in which the agency reviewed the public input and finalized the rule. The compensated participant seemed
unconcerned about possible fire risk, supplied no data for assertions on
possible injuries to children or buyers' needs, was redundant, and added
little not provided by many others. 212 However, the Commission Chairman said that the Consumer Product Safety Commission was "seriously
considering" ideas on maximizing consumer choice offered by the reimbursed party, while a Commissioner praised the individual for her candor
and for affording a "direct public" perspective that the agency did not
always receive. 213

6.

Unvented Gas Space Heaters

In the mid-1970's, the Consumer Product Safety Commission investigated the risks of carbon monoxide poisoning associated with unvented,
gas-fired space heaters (UGSH). 214 The agency's preliminary inquiry indicated that the space heaters were important heating sources in several
regions of the country, but that they posed unreasonable danger against
which no feasible standard could protect.215 Thus, the Consumer Product Safety Commission proposed a ban on the space heaters in February
1978, held regional hearings on the proposal during March, and funded
three citizens in two meetings. 216 The Commission learned in one of
these sessions about an oxygen-depletion safety (ODS) shutoff system
employed abroad and then explored the feasibility of applying the ODS
shutoff system in the United States, finding the concept workable. 217 The
212. See Transcript, Flammability of Children's Sleepwear, supra note 210, at 95-117. An important complication was that many manufacturers favored the amendments.
213. See id. at 115, 116 (statements of Chairman Simpson, Commissioner Franklin).
214. See 45 Fed. Reg. 61, 880-81 (1980). Cf. id. (discussion of proceeding's background prior to
iuuance of final rule).
215. See 43 Fed. Reg. 6235, 6238 (1978). The largest region was the South.
216. The notice proposing a ban and announcing the regional hearings in Washington, D.C.,
Dallas and Miami appears in id. at 11,731. The CPSC funded one citizen in Washington and two in
Dallas, Telephone interview with Patricia Chisley, CPSC Office of Secretary.
217. See infra note 220 and accompanying text (CPSC learning of the ODS system); infra text
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Consumer Product Safety Commission relied on its findings and the
heaters' wide use to issue a September 1980 rule that withdrew the ban
and required the ODS system for new heaters. 218
In the first session, two commissioners lauded the citizen for supplying
"very important input" and "good information to know" about the effect
of a ban and other data every commissioner "wanted to hear more
about," some of which ''just struck" one of them. 219 An agency Chairman said that the paid participants represented the elderly, the poor and
students who strongly opposed a ban because unvented, gas-fired space
heaters provided necessary heat for them. She stated that the Consumer
Product Safety Commission later explored existing European devices and
decided to rescind the proposal and develop a standard. The Chairman
added that funded "participation had a very significant impact on
[CPSC] progress on" the ban issue, while compensation permitted the
CPSC to "hear from actual consumers, not just industry," and to gather
important data on use patterns and product maintenance. 220 An agency
staffer agreed, claiming users' economic views were helpful and probably
had changed one "Commissioner's mind on going to a standard." 221 The
CPSC's self-study said that the compensated input, which indicated that
a ban might eliminate a major source of heating in the South and lead to
the use of more dangerous mechanisms, influenced the final decision. 222
But other staffers and observers thought the reimbursed public contributions less valuable, finding them anecdotal, emotional, or unsupported by
technical data. 223 Moreover, information on the ODS system supplied by
unfunded parties was more influential. 224 My reading of the testimony
accompanying notes 218, 224; 45 Fed. Reg. 61,880 (1980) (CPSC exploration and findings on workability of the ODS system).
218. 45 Fed. Reg. 61,880 (1980); cf 49 Fed. Reg. 46,108 (1984) (rule revocation because voluntary compliance).
219. See Transcript, Public Meeting on Unvented Gas Space Heaters, at 70-72, 75, Washington,
D.C. (Mar. 6, 1978) (statements ofComissioners Pittle, Franklin). Cf id. at 66 (funded participant's
claim that ban could lead to use of more dangerous devices). Accord CPSC Study, supra note 59, at
3; telephone interview with CPSC employee 1.
220. See telephone interview with Susan King, CPSC Chairman; Hearings 011 HUD-l11depe11de11t Agencies Appropriations for 1980 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Independent Agencies of the
Senate Appropriations Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 90 (1979) (statement of Chairman
King).
221. See telephone interview with CPSC employee 2.
222. See CPSC Study, supra note 59, at 3. Accord telephone interview with CPSC employee 1,
supra note 219.
223. See telephone interview with CPSC employees 3, 4, 5; industry representatives 1, 2.
224. Those unfunded were employees of Irish and Spanish producers whose testimony is in the
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indicates that Commission officials who were favorably impressed overestimated the impact of compensated parties. The citizens at the second
meeting made few new substantive contributions. One of the participants
supported the ban with little apparent appreciation of its economic effects, while the other individual only spoke generally to the economic
and safety issues. 225 The input provided by the person in the first session,
while more specific and helpful, was less relevant than it might have
been.226

7.

Chain Saws

In June 1978, the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the
Chain Saw Manufacturers Association agreed to work on a voluntary
standard to minimize chain saw injuries, which principally resulted from
"kickback." 227 Because the contract between the Consumer Product
Safety Commission and the Chain Saw Manufacturers Association provided for consumer involvement and agency funding, it is possible to
view the Association and citizens as reimbursed parties.228 But it is very
Transcript, Unvented Gas Space Heaters, supra note 219, at 32-58. Cf telephone interview with
CPSC employee l, supra note 219 (influence). See generally Consumer Product Safety Amendments
of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 2367 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., !st Sess. 407 (1983) (statement of Commissioner
Zagoria) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 2367 Hearings]; supra text accompanying notes 217, 220 (mention of influence). See also 45 Fed. Reg. 3762, 61,880, 61,881, 61,886 (1980); 44 Fed. Reg. 18,516
(1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 29,011, 55,772 (1978) (discussions of proceeding).
225. See Transcript, Public Meeting on Unvented Gas Space Heaters, at 30-34, 83-92 Dallas,
Tex. (Mar. 28, 1978) (statements of funded participants 2, 3).
226. See Transcript, Unvented Gas Space Heaters, supra note 219, at 59-75 (statements of
funded participant l). As to overestimation, only one commissioner attended both hearings, many
years have passed, and some officials may have been referring to unfunded parties.
227. See CPSC Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 98th Cong., lst Sess. 131 (1983) (statement of
CSMA) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Senate Reauthorization Hearings]; 43 Fed. Reg. 26,103. The
CSMA is a trade association that represents most producers. Compare CPSC Reauthorization:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. For Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 97th Cong., lst Sess. 150 (1981) (statement of Donald Purcell, CSMA President)
[hereinafter cited as 1981 Senate Reauthorization Hearings] with CPSC Reauthorization: Hearings
on H.R. 2271 and H.R. 2201 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., !st Sess. 443 (1981) (CPSC response to Purcell testimony) (differing views of prior industry voluntary efforts) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 2271 Hearings].
Cf id. at 552-77; 1981 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra at 151-55; 1983 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra at 131-35 (statements of Donald Purcell); 46 Fed. Reg. 26,262-64 (1981); 45
Fed. Reg. 62,392-93 (1980); 43 Fed. Reg. 26,103 (1978) (discussions of proceeding).
228. See Agreement to Jointly Develop a Voluntary Safety Standard for Chain Saws Between
Chain Saw Manufacturers Association and U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Article V
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difficult to assess the impact of the CSMA or consumers as intra-industry
feuding prevented satisfactory completion of the project. 229 Although
the endeavor seemed to be progressing productively, albeit slowly, before
unraveling, 230 the Commission apparently failed to capitalize on the effort expended when the project might have been salvaged. The initiative
eventually degenerated into name-calling between the Consumer Product
Safety Commission and the Chain Saw Manufacturers Association. 231
Thus, eight years after being petitioned to write mandatory controls, and
six years after the joint endeavor aborted, 232 the Commission accepted
voluntary requirements proposed by the industry which are similar to
those developed in the project. 233 This agency decision ended an unfortunate effort in which there was much blame to share. The endeavor was
pursued at a cost of more than $1,000,000 to manufacturers of chain
saws, at the expense of more than $500,000 to the Commission and at
great cost to the public in terms of injuries and deaths attributable to
failure to improve safety and increased product costs. 234
(June l, 1978), reprinted in H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 227, at 599, 607. Cf. Agreement supra,·
1981 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 227, at 152 (statement of Donald Purcell); 43 Fed.
Reg. 26, 104 (1978) (discussion of work's organization and consumers).
229. It is difficult to ascertain precisely what happened, but I believe the conclusions offered,
which reflect composite assessments drawn from interviewing many familiar with the project, accurately identify the principal protagonists and the major areas of controversy. Accord 1981 Senate
Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 227, at 4, 276 (statements of General Counsel Krulwich; Commissioner Zagoria). Compare H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 227, at 407-08 (statement of Commissioner Pittle), and at 444 (CPSC response to Purcell testimony) with id. at 750-51 (representative
conflicting impressions of what happened) (statement of Donald Purcell).
230. See, e.g., H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 227, at 750-51; telephone interviews with CPSC
employees 1, 2; funded participants 1, 2.
231. See telephone interviews with CPSC employee 2, funded participant 1, supra note 230
(CPSC failure); What Can Sway CPSC Is Shown in King's Views, Product Safety Letter at 3 (Jan. 26,
1981); Chain Saw Makers Blast CPSC, Product Safety Letter at 4 (Feb. 9, 1981), reprinted in pertinent part in Harter, supra note 79, at 62 nn.345-46 and accompanying text (name-calling). The
CPSC reportedly asserted that the CSMA was "comprised of macho manufacturers who stonewalled
the agency," while the CSMA reportedly "responded that the problem lay in 'the ineptitude, bias
and mismanagement casually dispensed' by the agency's staff." Id.
232. See 43 Fed. Reg. 26,103 (1978) (petition). Cf. 45 Fed. Reg. 62,392 (1980) (endeavor's
December 1979 abortion); 46 Fed. Reg. 26,262 (1981); 47 Fed. Reg. 19,369 (1982); 1983 Senate
Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 227, at 17, 131-34 (statements of Commissioner Zagoria,
CSMA President Donald Purcell); Hearings on HUD-Independent Agencies Appropriations for

1984 Before the Subcomm. /or HUD-Independent Agencies of the House Appropriations Comm.,
98th Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 2, 22 (1983) (statement of Chairman Stoerts) [hereinafter cited as 1984
House Appropriations Hearings]: infra note 233 and accompanying text (CPSC efforts after endeavor's abortion).
233. See 50 Fed. Reg. 35,241 (1985).
234. See H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 227, at 751 ("Industry conservatively expended $1.2
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The sources interviewed gave mixed appraisals of the Chain Saw Manufacturers Association. The CSMA President stated that the work was
"characterized by complete openness and active participation by government, consumer and industry representatives," producers "candidly
shared their expertise" with everyone, and those involved developed an
"extremely sophisticated approach to measuring kickback" and engaged
in the most "comprehensive attempt to deal with chainsaw kickback anywhere in the world." 235 A funded technical expert found that the
CSMA's "basic methodology, approach, and technical input were excellent."236 He said that the Chain Saw Manufacturers Association did a
"nice job of coordinating the effort" and of avoiding adversary confrontations. 237 The technical person also reported that the project had been
"proceeding extremely well" to a balanced, feasible solution when the
endeavor "blew apart" and that it could have been saved but that "common sense did not prevail," adding that the effort was not wasted, because it generated valuable data for later standard work by the
Commission and the industry. 238 An extra-agency evaluator concurred,
but wondered if voluntary endeavors would have moved faster had the
Consumer Product Safety Commission begun mandatory standard development earlier. 239 An agency employee thought that the Chain Saw
Manufacturers Association produced a "piece of work way ahead of its
time" but "failed to seize the initiative" and provided "spotty project
million to Sl.5 million" on the project) (statement of Donald Purcell); Hearings on HUD-Ind~pendent Agencies Appropriations for

1982 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Independent Agencies of
the House Comm. on Appropriatlons, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 839 (1981) (noting that the CPSC
spent approximately SS00,000) (statement of Acting Chairman Statler) [hereinafter cited as 1982
House Approprlatlons Hearings]. Cf. H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 227, at 751 (CSMA $600,000
estimate). Costs to the public also include taxpayer dollars the CPSC spent. Cf. 50 Fed. Reg. 35,241
(1985); 1984 House Approprlations Hearlngs, supra note 232, at 2-3 (statement of Chairman Sto~rts);
1983 Senate Reauthorlzatlon Hearlngs, supra note 227, at 134-35 (discussion of injuries CPSC estimates at 123,000 annually) (statement of Donald Purcell). But cf. ld. (CSMA criticism of estimate).
235. See 1981 Senate Reauthorlzation Hearlngs, supra note 227, at 152; H.R. 2271 Hearlngs,
supra note 227, at 557, 751 (statements of Donald Purcell).
236. See telephone interview with funded participant 1, supra note 220.
237. Id. But cf. infra notes 251-55 and accompanying text (industry division and recalcitrance
complicated effort).
238. See telephone interview with funded participant l, supra note 230 (quotations). Accord
1982 House Approprlations Hearings, supra note 234, at 557-58, 751 (statement of Donald Purcell);
telephone interview with funded participant 3. See telephone interview with funded participant 1,
supra note 230 (valuable data generation). Accord 1984 House Appropriatlons Hearlngs, supra note
232, at 406-07 (statement of Commissioner Zagoria); 1981 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra
note 227, at 152 (statement of Donald Purcell).
239. See Schwartz, supra note 68, at 70 n.272.
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management."240 He and others believed that the CSMA and the Commission neglected to save the effort once it began deteriorating. 241
The Consumer Product Safety Commission said that "much sound engineering and analytical work" was performed before the project's expiration date but that "no requirements were drafted by the
committees."242 Commission staff who evaluated the" 'discussion draft,'
consisting of performance requirements for chain saws and backup documentation," tendered by the CSMA and represented as "both 'a final
standard and a rationale,' " 243 identified many deficiencies in the materials proferred and expressed "serious doubts that the standard as submitted would reduce injuries." 244
The Program Manager of the Consumer Product Safety Commission
said that the Chain Saw Manufacturers Association's submission was a
"draft," and by its "own admission incomplete,'' which was "written by
the CSMA without input from" consumers, agency staff or the Standard
Review Board. 245 The Board rejected the CSMA's submission because it
lacked "a sound technical basis" and because it was developed outside
the 1978 contract, which fact undermined its independence. 246
One Commissioner found that the Consumer Product Safety Commission "had to start over in the mandatory route" because the submission
included some requirements validating current chain saws and no proposals for change while lacking a thorough technical rationale. 247 The
deficiencies above, and the Chain Saw Manufacturers Association's failure to fulfill its contract, underlay the Commission's decision to eschew
240. See telephone interview with CPSC employee 2, supra note 230.
241. See id.; telephone interviews with funded participants 1, 2, supra note 230.
242. See 45 Fed. Reg. 62,392-93 (1980).
243. See id. at 62,393.
244. The quoted language appears, and the specific deficiencies are listed, in id. at 62,393. Cf. 46
Fed. Reg. 26,262, 26,269-70 (1981) (more discussion of deficiencies).
245. Telephone interview with CPSC employee 1, supra note 230.
246. Id.
247. See 1982 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 234, at 570; H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra
note 227, at 408 (statements of Commissioner Pittle). The Commissioner also appeared prescient
because, when the CSMA-CPSC contract was being negotiated, he had evinced concern about the
CSMA's ability to develop satisfactory requirements in time. The Commissioner was also concerned
about the time that would be lost were the project to abort. See CPSC Decision on Petition for
Promulgation of a Consumer Product Safety Standard to Reduce Chain Saw Kickback, Doc. No.
77-10, 15-19 (Apr. 27, 1978) (Commissioner Pittle, dissenting), reprinted in perti11ent part in
Schwartz, supra note 68, at 70 n.272. But cf. H.R. 2271 Hearings. supra note 227, at 33 (commissioners believed voluntary approach quicker but may have allotted insufficient time) (statements of
Chairman King).
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reliance on the CSMA's voluntary process· to protect the public. 248 The
Consumer Product Safety Commission's Acting Chairman summarized
the sentiments of the commissioners and agency staff when he testified
that an "18-month cooperative effort with the chainsaw industry unfortunately failed to produce a voluntary standard which could be expected
to substantially reduce injuries." 249
In fairness, many difficulties attended this endeavor. A Chairman observed that the industry did "not speak with one voice," 250 and one Commissioner thought that producers disagreed substantially over how to
achieve safety. 251 Another Commissioner described the industry as
"very competitive with a lot of members who" believed that their solution was best. 252 A third Commissioner and the general counsel of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission thought that it was very difficult
to develop voluntary controls because the largest manufacturer strongly
opposed the technical approach of the Chain Saw Manufacturers Association, the organization created to represent most of the producers. 253
Two other commissioners believed that the industry was recalcitrant at
certain junctures of the work, while one found that the effort's "total
openness" was responsible for its "glacial pace, for much public posturing and little candor," and for stilted exchanges, distrust, and reluctance
to disclose needed data on sales, marketing plans and technological advances. 254 The Consumer Product Safety Commission also failed to facilitate work by providing adequate technical assistance, sufficient
See 45 Fed. Reg. 62,392, 62,393 (1980).
See H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 227, at 340 (statement of Acting Chairman Statler).
See id. at 36 (statement of Chairman King).
See 1983 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 227, at 17; 1984 House Appropriations
H«irings. supra note 232, at 24 (statements of Commissioner Zagoria).
252. See Hearings on HUD-Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1983 Before the Subcomm.
on HUD-Independent Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at
570 (1982) (statement of Commissioner Pittle) [hereinafter cited as 1983 House Appropriations
Hearings].
253. See 1981 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 227, at 4, 276 (statements of Commissioner Zagoria, General Counsel Krulwich). Accord telephone interview with funded participant
2, supra note 230. Cf H.R. 2271 Hearings. supra note 227, at 405 (CSMA had to represent larger
248.
249.
250.
251.

producers that committed resources to safety and other producers lacking resources) (statement of
Acting Chairman Statler).
254. See 1984 House Appropriation Hearings, supra note 232, at 23; 1983 House Appropriations
Hearings, supra note 252, at 571 (two believed industry recalcitrant) (statements of Commissioners
Statler, Sloan). Accord H.R. 2271 Hearings. supra note 227, at 443 (CPSC response to Purcell testimony). See Statler, Let the Sunshine In, 67 A.B.A. J. 573, 574 (1981) (one critical of "total
openness").
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communication among commissioners, agency staff and the industry, and
effective management, especially in salvaging the effort. 255
Although the project's abortive nature complicates analysis of citizen
input, many praised it. The Chain Saw Manufacturers Association's
President said that the consumers were "intelligent, hard working and
very dedicated," offering much "excellent input" that contributed greatly
to subsequent voluntary work. 256 One committee head found "very valuable" the perspectives of those "in the field." 257 A second committee
head thought the non-commercial participants "put in endless hours of
hard work and demonstrated a high degree of creativity with willingness
to consider different viewpoints." 258 The Program Manager of the Consumer Product Safety Commission could "not praise the public enough
for dedication, very, very high quality work," and for producing a
"splendid record" and perceptively analyzing considerable data to "arrive at sensible conclusions. " 259 An individual with technical expertise,
who believed himself a "devil's advocate" although he apparently was a
very effective conciliator, found contributions by several citizens to be
"extremely helpful and exceedingly valuable." 260 Another consumer was
described by a citizen as an "aggressive, feisty, gadfly" who was most
effective in "asking tough technical questions" of industry engineers and
255. Numerous industry representatives have said that much time was consumed educating
CPSC employees. See, e.g., H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 227, at 557 (statement of Donald Purcell); telephone interviews with industry representatives. But others involved agreed. See, e.g., telephone interviews with funded participants, l, 2, supra note 230. CPSC employee 2, supra note 230,
also said that the commissioners were unaware of potential solutions being discussed by staff and
that they rejected a promising staff-industry agreement in Spring, 1980. The CSMA's President
asserted that CPSC staff had supported much in the CSMA's initial submission and most of its
subsequent efforts and had worked well with the CSMA from 1981until1983, although the relationship of"policymakers" with the CSMA remained "somewhat ambiguous." See H.R. 2271 Hearings,
supra note 227, at 751; 1983 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 227, at 132-33. But cj
supra text accompanying note 244 (staff criticisms of CSMA submission); 1981 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 227, at 169 (CPSC fully cooperated with industry) (statement of David
Swankin).
256. See telephone interview with Donald Purcell, CSMA President.
257. See Transcript, Standard Review Board Meeting, at 36, Bethesda, Md. (Nov. 30, 1979)
(statement of Jack Ehlen).
258. See id. at 5 (statement of Ralph Lombard). An industry representative found that one
citizen was "marginally helpful in examining the CPSC in-depth investigations" and that another
"had good ideas" but ultimately "delivered little." Id.
259. Telephone interview with CPSC employee number 1, supra note 230.
260. See telephone interview with funded participant 1, supra note 230. The individual said the
citizen mentioned infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text "represented a viewpoint valuable to
have." Id. Cj Transcript, Standard Review Board Meeting, supra note 257, at 4, 11 (examples of
conciliatory role).
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agency staff. 261 One Consumer Product Safety Commission employee
described the same consumer as "very hard working and tenacious. " 262
A second staffer, however, thought that the individual held "troublesome
preconceptions" and that he was "part of the problem. " 263

8.

Upholstered Furniture

In September 1977, the Consumer Product Safety Commission made a
preliminary finding that a mandatory standard was necessary to protect
the public against risks from cigarette ignition of upholstered furniture. 264 Because the Commission was uncertain about how to treat the
hazards, the agency held a public meeting in December 1978 to ascertain
the views of the public and of manufacturers on possible approaches to
risks posed by upholstered furniture. 265 The CPSC provided funding for
one consumer who advocated compulsory controls,266 which producers
opposed. Industry representatives submitted "considerable new data" on
voluntary compliance, which apparently influenced the agency. 267 Primarily because of the industry's fragmented character, however, the initiative became lengthy and complex. 268 The Consumer Product Safety
Commission explored many approaches, but the Upholstered Furniture
Action Council's (UFAC) offer to institute a "voluntary action program"
261. Telephone interview with funded participant 2, supra note 230.
262. Telephone interview with CPSC employee 3.
263. See telephone interview with CPSC employee 2, supra note 230. The staffer added that
producers "played off citizens in a highly competitive dog fight between industry members." Id. Cf
telephone interview with Susan King, supra note 220 (project "went through so many iterations" she
could not "remember how useful" funded participation was).
264. See 43 Fed. Reg. 56,256 (1978). CPSC asserts that "24,500 upholstered furniture fires
caused by smoldering cigarettes kill 1200 people" annually. H.R. 2367 Hearings, supra note 224, at
315. Cf Hearings on HUD-Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1987 Before the Subcomm on
HUD-Independent Agencies of the House Comm on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at
606 (1986) (800-900 fatalities in 1985) (statement of Commissioner Statler) [hereinafter cited as 1987
House Appropriations Hearings]; H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 227, at 159-74 (statement of William Stevens); Letter from Upholstered Furniture Action Council (UFAC) to CPSC (Jan. 6, 1981),
reprinted in 1981 Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 227, at 164; 43 Fed. Reg. 56, 256-57
(1978) (discussions of proceeding).
265. See 43 Fed. Reg. 56,256 (1978); Transcript, Meeting on Upholstered Furniture Flammability, at 2, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 20, 1978) (meeting and purposes) (statement of Chairman King).
266. See Transcript, Meeting on Upholstered Furniture Flammability, supra note 265, at 235-50.
Cf. infra notes 277-82 and accompanying text (more discussion of consumer's input).
267. The quoted characterization is Chairman King's. See 1981 Senate Reauthorization Hearings. supra note 227, at 26. Cf Transcript, Upholstered Furniture Flammability, supra note 259
(industry testimony).
268. See UFAC Letter, supra note 264; telephone interview with CPSC employee 1.
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so impressed the commissioners that in November 1979 they postponed
agency proposal of mandatory requirements. 269 Indeed, the CPSC has
acquiesced in the voluntary endeavor ever since. In October 1981, the
commissioners unanimously voted to have the agency staff discontinue
compulsory standard development and work with the UFAC until evaluation of its project indicated a need for binding controls. 270 In April
1984, the CPSC characterized the voluntary compliance effort as the
"most promising approach for adequately protecting the public" and said
that "renewed consideration" of mandatory regulation was "unnecessary," because it "could inhibit greater improvements in the voluntary
program."271 Two Commission chairmen were disappointed by the industry's initial lack of success,272 but agency staff have been more satisfied with recent work, while one Commissioner even testified that the
producers had "made tremendous progress and will continue to [do
so]."273 Although the proceeding seemed destined to "bumble along as a
relative stalemate until the cigarette or furniture industry" acceded or
new technology emerged,274 Congress intervened in October 1984 and
supported research on cigarettes that pose less risk of igniting upholstered furniture. 275
269. See Chairman King's characterization supra text accompanying note 267; H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 227, at 161, 341 (statements of William Stevens and Acting Chairman Statler);
Schwartz, supra note 68, at 70 n.272. Although industry promotion of the program at the 1978
meeting alone may not have convinced the CPSC, the UFAC contends it was important. See H.R.
2271 Hearings, supra note 227, at 160-61 (statement of William Stevens); UFAC Letter, supra note

264.
270. See CPSC Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1981) (statement of Chairman
Stoerts).
271. See Letter from Chairman Stoerts to Arthur Delibert, President of the Citizens Committee
for Fire Protection (Apr. 5, 1984). Cf. H.R. 2367 Hearings, supra note 224, at 213-14 (statement of
Charles Carey); 1984 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 232, at 4 (proceeding's history from
October 1981 to April 1984) (statement of Chairman Stoerts).
272. See H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 227, at 329, 341 (statement of Acting Chairman Stat·
!er); Hearings on Department ofHousing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1981 Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Independent Agencies of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 120 (1980) (statement of Chairman King). Cf.
Schwartz, supra note 68, at 70 n.272 (effort disappointingly slow).
273. CPSC employee 2 said industry had "made fairly good improvement" (telephone interview). See H.R. 2367 Hearings, supra note 224, at 407 (statement of Commissioner Zagoria).
274. CPSC employee l, supra note 268, offered the prescient quotation, ascribing this partly to
the furniture industry's "very fractured nature."
275. See Cigarette Safety Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-567, 98 Stat. 2925, 2926 (1984); cf. Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-88, 99 Stat. 332 (1985) ($500,000 appropriation for activities authorized by Cigarette
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Assessment of the funded input is complicated by its brevity and by
the length and complexity of the initiative on upholstered furniture.
During the meeting, a Commissioner said that the consumer "added a
balance" which otherwise would not have been available, was obviously
"technically well-versed," and "shook him up" by charging the Consumer Product Safety Commission with favoritism toward industry. 276
One agency staffer "rated the consumer very highly," and another
thought her a "very effective, outspoken consumer advocate," 277 but
neither Commission employee could say whether she influenced agency
decisionmaking. 278 A third CPSC staff member found the individual to
be an "articulate, forceful, well-prepared advocate who knew her stuff
and effectively marshalled arguments" and "as effective as one person
could be making a one-shot presentation" in a small segment of a "big,
long process" where "different approaches were constantly being torn
apart," although "she probably did not have a substantial impact on the
outcome." 279 Despite the positive tone of these appraisals, analysis of the
consumer's testimony indicates that she intended to offer little of substance, championed mandatory controls but provided minimal supporting data, and castigated the Commission for neglecting consumers and
"catering to special interests," thereby allowing manufacturers to dominate the regulatory process. 280 Moreover, her ideas effectively were rejected by the Consumer Product Safety Commission, which pursued,
until quite recently, the approach urged by industry in the same
meeting. 281
Safety Act of 1984); Hearings on HUD-Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1987 Before the
Subcomm. on HUD-Independent Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. I, at 73 (1986) (subsequent work paid for principally from money appropriated to CPSC).
For discussion of subsequent developments, indicating that the Consumer Product Safety Commission is continuing to work closely with manufacturers to develop voluntary standards, that industry
intent to comply is satisfactory, and that there have been certain technical innovations which could
lead to development of an improved standard, see 1987 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note
264, at 606 (statements of Acting Chairman Dawson, Commissioner Statics).
276. See Transcript, Upholstered Furniture Flammability, supra note 265, at 247 (statement of
Commissioner Zagoria).
277. See telephone interviews with CPSC employee 2, supra note 273; CPSC employee 3.
278. See telephone interviews, supra note 277.
279. See telephone interview with CPSC employee 4.
280. See Transcript, Upholstered Furniture Flammability, supra note 265, at 235-50. Little was
olfered, because she was awaiting a CPSC proposal issuance of which seemed imminent. Id. at 23637, 241.
281. See supra notes 266-67, 269-70, 275-76 and accompanying text.
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Asbestos General Rulemaking

During 1979, the Consumer Product Safety Commission began an asbestos proceeding distinct from, and broader than, the proceeding concerning asbestos patching compounds. 282 In October, the Commission
attempted to assess comprehensively the use of asbestos, published an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) seeking data on
consumer products containing asbestos and possible regulatory approaches for reducing public exposure to sources of asbestos, and paid
three groups to comment. 283 The CPSC analyzed the public comments
and issued a 1980 General Order, which required producers to submit
data on asbestos use in products, so as to help the CPSC ascertain the
propriety of regulatory action to protect the public. 284 The General Order was "purely investigatory" and purported to make "no final regulatory decisions" on products listed therein. 285 Although the agency
informed Congress in 1981 that it planned "to test selected products,
determine exposure and risk, and consider appropriate options for reducing the risks found," the CPSC subsequently has regulated few asbestoscontaining products. 286
One funded entity prepared thorough data on the dangers of the use of
asbestos in art materials. Commission staff estimated that such information would have cost ten times more if secured on a contract basis. The
submission, which "identified an extremely hazardous product, free form
asbestos, [which the] staff was unaware was commercially available," was
transmitted to the agency's product-recall division for investigation. 287
Because this evaluation was drawn from the CPSC's own study, it may
be suspect. The submission did not convince the Commission to regulate
specific art goods or retain innovative regulatory approaches proposed in
282. See supra § II.B.4 of this Article (APC). Cf 44 Fed. Reg. 60,057 (1979) (ANPRM commencing proceeding); id. at 60,057-61; 45 Fed. Reg. 84,384-88 (1980); Merrill, CPSC Regu/atio11 of
Ca11cer Risks i11 Co11Sumer Products, 61 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1351-54 (1981) (discussion of
proceeding).
283. See 44 Fed. Reg. 60,057 (1979) (all except payment); cf Merrill, supra note 282, at 1351
(ANPRM set "huge task for" CPSC); CPSC Study, supra note 59, at 6 (groups were Center for
Occupational Hazards (COH), National Consumers League (NCL), and EDF).
284. See 45 Fed. Reg. 84,384 (1980).
285. Id.
286. See 1982 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 234, at 805 (CPSC statement). But cf
supra note 283; infra text accompanying note 290 (enormous project); 51 Fed. Reg. 33,910 (1986)
(notice of enforcement policy governing the labeling of asbestos-containing household products).
287. See CPSC Study, supra note 59, at 4; COH Comments 2.
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the ANPRM. 288 In fairness, an agency staffer found that the comments
provided a "wealth of information on asbestos-containing products and
alleged substitutes," an observation that my own reading confirms. 289
Moreover, the asbestos initiative was an enormous undertaking. 290 The
CPSC has been criticized for the slow pace of its regulation, 291 and some
Commission staffers attribute inaction to the fact that other products
posed more risk or that different projects had higher priority, thus indicating that art goods were never very appropriate for regulation. 292
Outside analysts claimed that the CPSC already was familiar with most
of the art materials that the group designated for possible regulation,
used only one idea the organization supplied in compiling the General
Order list, and overvalued the submission in the agency self-study. Nevertheless, these analysts found that the "comments were extensive" and
that the "staff was investigating [asbestos powder's] commercial availability."293 The external study also seems to be premised on linkages between reimbursed public input and Commission decisions when there
had been no final regulatory action and none may have been warranted.
This last observation also applies to the extra-agency evaluation of the
other two compensated submissions. The outside analysts stated that
one set of comments "seemed only to [affirm the CPSC's] regulatory approach" and to offer data agency staff could have assembled as easily and
cheaply, although the submission's criticism of the "generic" approach
being explored by the Commission "was generally sound."294 The individual who prepared the input said that funding enabled him "to do
more thorough research" on his organization's comments which can be
characterized most accurately as responses to nine questions asked in the
ANPRM. 295 The third group's comments were said by the external
evaluators only to have confirmed "staff beliefs on asbestos dangers"
288. See telephone interviews with CPSC employees 1, 2, 3 (not regulating art goods).
289. See Memorandum from J. Keenan to R. Fausett 31 (May 21, 1980).
290. See supra note 283.
291. The COH employee with primary responsibility for preparing its comments, and the funded
party in the APC proceeding have so criticized the CPSC. See telephone interview with COH employee and funded participant, supra note 202.
292. See telephone interviews with CPSC employees 1, 3, supra note 288; telephone interview
with CPSC employee 4.
293. See Stellato & Wright, supra note 64, at 21.
294. See id. at 20-21.
295. See telephone interview with David Swankin (the input preparer). The description is drawn
from my reading of the NCL's comments.
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while ignoring the difficulties of generic regulation. 296 However, the submission "made several suggestions [as to] public education and safe disposal" on which the CPSC had not acted. 297 An agency staffer observed
that the organization tendered data "not otherwise available," that the
Commission "could not have gathered," covering "products agency officials had not heard of before."298 I found that the comments supported
the CPSC's regulatory approach and, while rather general, they offered
many specific ideas. 299
All of the compensated parties urged a more liberal policy regarding
the disclosure of industry data than the policy the Consumer Product
Safety Commission ultimately adopted. 300 Moreover, agency employees
with substantive responsibility for assessing the comments said that "specific data on [asbestos use] in consumer products did not meet staff expectations," thus requiring issuance of the General Order, but that the
submissions offered the Consumer Product Safety Commission viewpoints that were "different from industry." 301
JO.

Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insulation

In October 1976, the Consumer Office of the Denver District Attorney
petitioned the CPSC to regulate Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insulation
(UFFI), because the product caused "unreasonable risk of injury or irritation. "302 In February 1979, the commissioners deferred their decision
on that petition but instructed staff, and held four regional hearings in
the winter of 1979-1980, to collect more data on the health effects of the
gas released by UFFI and to ascertain whether there were a need for
regulation. 303 Uncertainty existed about the causal relationship between
UFFI and health problems experienced by occupants of UFFI-insulated
296. See Stellato & Wright, supra note 64, at 20-21.
297. Id.
298. See telephone interview with CPSC employee 2, supra note 288.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 296-98.
300. See COH Comments, at 16-19; NCL Comments, at 2; EDF Comments, at 7. Cf. 45 Fed.
Reg. 84,384, 84,385-87 (1980) (CPSC industry data-release policy).
301. See Memorandum, Staff Review of Comments, from H. Spritzer, R. Fausett, Chronic
Chemical Hazards Program, to Commissioners 5, 2 (Sept. 16, 1980).
302. See 47 Fed. Reg. 14,366-69 (1982). Cf. 44 Fed. Reg. 12,080-81 (1979); Ashford, Ryan &
Caldart, A Hard Look at Federal Regulation of Formaldehyde: A Departure From Reasoned Decisionmaking, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 358-68 (1983); Merrill, supra note 282, at 1354-60 {discussion of proceeding).
303. See 44 Fed. Reg. 12,080, 12,081 (1979); 47 Fed. Reg. 14,366, 14,367-68 (1982); 44 Fed.
Reg. 69,578 (1979).
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dwellings. 304 Industry contended that because inadequate data existed to
ban UFFI a standard would suffice. 305 Thus, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission solicited input from installers and people believed to
have been harmed by UFFI, funding thirty-seven parties. 306 In early
1980, the Commission assembled a panel of sixteen senior government
scientists and sponsored technical workshops to scrutinize the health effects of UFFI. 307 In June, the CPSC issued a proposal requiring industry
to inform buyers of the possible health effects of UFFI. 308 But the Commission then reached a preliminary conclusion that gas released after installation of UFFI posed an "unreasonable risk of injury" against which
"no feasible standard" could safeguard; the CPSC proposed a ban on the
use of UFFI in February 1981, and finalized the proscription one year
later. 309 That rule was overturned in April 1983. 310
Appraisal of citizens' input in the UFFI proceeding is complicated by
the number of contributors. The agency's own study focused on one witness in Atlanta who said that he had become ill when UFFI was placed
in his house and that doctors initially could not identify his problem because his symptoms were unfamiliar. The funded party also suggested
that the Commission provide physicians with relevant diagnostic data. 311
304. See 44 Fed. Reg. 69,578-80 (1979); telephone interview with Susan King, supra note 220.
305. See H.R. 2271 Hearings, supra note 227, at 689-739 (representative articulation of industry's position) (statements of J. Ramey, J. Bender, Formaldehyde Institute). Cf id. at 15 (commissioners met 30 times with industry when considering regulation) (statement of Chairman King).
306. See 44 Fed. Reg. 69,578, 69,580 (1979); CPSC Study, supra note 59, at 7-9.
307. See 47 Fed. Reg. 14,366, 14,369 (1982). Cf id. at 14,369-71 (discussion of composition and
findings of Federal Panel on Formaldehyde). For a discussion of the technical workshops conducted
by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), see 47 Fed. Reg. 14,366, 14,368 (1982).
308. See 45 Fed. Reg. 39,434 (1980). The proposal was premised partially on a National Academy of Sciences study that indicated there was no determined human threshold for formaldehyde's
irritant effects. Id. at 39,437.
309. As to the preliminary conclusion and the ban proposal, see 46 Fed. Reg. 11,188 (1981).
The Federal Panel on Formaldehyde issued its report in November 1980. See id. at 11,190. The
final rule appears at 47 Fed. Reg. 14,366 (1982).
310. See Gulf South Insulation v. CPSC, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983). Cf Hearings on Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1985 Before the
Subcomm. on HUD-Independent Agencies of the House Appropriations Comm., 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 33 (1984) (overturning unfortunate because UFFI dangerous but Solicitor General
rejected CPSC request that writ of certiorari be filed with the United States Supreme Court) (statement of Chairman Stoerts); Borden, Inc. v. Comm'r of Public Health, 388 Mass. 707, 448 N.E.2d
367, cert. denied sub nom. Formaldehyde Institute v. Frechette, 464 U.S. 936 (1983) (decision upholding state UFFI ban); Rapco Foam v. CPSC, C.A. No. 80-2508-3 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 1982) (unsuccessful challenge to UFFI proceeding).
311. See CPSC Study, supra note 59, at 3-4; Transcript, Public Meeting on UFFI, at 479-99,
especially 489-90, Atlanta, Ga. (Jan. 10, 1980).
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The CPSC's Executive Director was "persuaded" that the witness had
"correctly" indicated that the medical community had a need for information to minimize the anguish caused by an "inability to identify
promptly the symptoms." 312 The official was so impressed that, upon the
completion of the testimony, he announced that the Consumer Product
Safety Commission would "begin an immediate information campaign so
at least doctors would be sensitive to identifying formaldehyde toxicity. "313 Agency staff then convinced the Journal of the American Medical Association to publish data describing the symptoms of people
exposed to UFFP 14 and distributed similar information to state health
departments. 315 The individual's input, and that of other witnesses, persuaded Commission staff to warn "consumers of [UFFI's] potential
health hazards" immediately, and, in June 1980, the CPSC issued the
proposal requiring the disclosure of safety data. 316 Two other participants compensated for speaking in the Atlanta session said that physicians had experienced considerable difficulty in ascertaining that UFFI
had caused their health problems, while one added that the "hazards
should be well known so people can get [assistance]."317 A Commissioner who was present found another citizen's ideas "most helpful,"
while the agency's Executive Director said that a fifth person described
"very pointedly [the] difficulties consumers faced." 318
The input of seven reimbursed parties in the Portland hearing evoked
few questions from CPSC personnel. The testimony consisted principally of descriptions of UFFI-related health problems, distinguished primarily by unfocused monologues on abuse of the mobile home industry
by government and mistreatment of a patient by doctors. 319 Four funded
individuals who testified at the Minneapolis meeting offered little new
information. They related experiences derived from living in UFFI-insulated homes without clearly linking the product's installation and their
(

312. See Transcript, UFFI Meeting, supra note 311, at 491 (statement of Richard Gross).
313. See id. at 491-93.
314. See CPSC Study, supra note 59, at 3; 243 J. A.M.A. 1697 (1980).
315. See CPSC Study, supra note 59, at 3.
316. See id. at 3-4 (staft); supra note 308 and accompanying text (proposal).
317. See Transcript, UFFI Meeting, supra note 311, at 21, 50 et seq. (two participants' input); cf.
id. at 59 (specific quotation).
318. See id. at 415 (statement of Commissioner Statler), referring to testimony in id. at 404 el
seq.; Transcript, Public Meeting on UFFI, at 99, Atlanta, Ga. (Jan. 11, 1980) (statement of Richard
Gross), referring to testimony in id. at 5.
319. See Transcript, Public Meeting on UFFI, Portland, Ore. (Dec. 13, 1979). Cf. id. at 232 el
seq.; 284 et seq. (two monologues).
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illness, and the views offered elicited few queries from agency officials. 320
However, a fifth person, who inspected 100 houses containing UFFI,
supplied considerable complaint-investigation data on the percentages of
foam found in the homes, the effects on occupants of the dwellings and
individuals' symptoms, causal relationships between UFFI and health effects, and medical verification of injuries suffered. 321 A Commissioner
who attended the session said that the witness had "really done a very
thorough job [which would] be very helpful to epidemiology staff." 322
Two paid participants in the Hartford hearing were physicians who
had interesting scientific exchanges with agency staff. 323 The Consumer
Product Safety Commission Executive Director found that one of these
doctors was "extremely helpful" and stated that the Commission was
"going to be able to deal with the problem," because a citizen had "so
intelligently" conveyed his concerns. 324 But three other witnesses, who
lived in UFFI-insulated dwellings only spoke of its installation and
health effects, adding little that was novel. 325 A seventh compensated
organization submitted extensive data that was gathered from individuals, state agencies, and public interest groups, on consumer experiences
with UFFI. 326 This entity's counsel offered valuable ideas on agency regulatory options and participated in lively dialogue on the CPSC's legal
authority with staff, while the Executive Director solicited his opinion on
several legal issues and praised the lawyer for providing "very insightful"
and "extremely perceptive testimony." 327
The attorney said that citizens reimbursed in the Hartford and Portland meetings submitted "good testimony" about using UFFI, "offgassing, and leaving their homes because of difficulties encountered." 328
One agency staffer found that this lawyer "raised interesting legal questions about agency authority." 329 The employee also believed that it was
320. See Transcript, Public Meeting on UFFI, at 660 et seq., 833 et seq., 847 et seq., 979 et seq.,
Minneapolis, Minn. (Feb. 6, 1980).
321. See id. at 749 et seq.
322. See id. at 754 (statement of Commissioner Pittle).
323. See Transcript, Public Meeting on UFFI, at 1411 et seq., 1536 et seq., Hartford, Conn. (Feb.
27, 1980).
324. See id. at 1428; 1572-73 (statements of Richard Gross).
325. See id. at 1125 et seq., 1024 et seq., 1262 et seq., 1559 et seq.
326. The data are in the CPSC's UFFI file.
327. See Transcript, UFFI Meeting, supra note 311, at 1387 et seq. (testimony); id. at 1410
(Executive Director's remarks).
328. See Swankin telephone interview, supra note 295.
329. Telephone interview with CPSC employee 1.
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"helpful for c0Illllllss1oners to see and talk to victims. " 330 Another
staffer said that funded input enabled the CPSC to secure a helpful "picture of injury scenarios from the consumer viewpoint" and to "hear from
foamers themselves" and that these data underlay the ban because "no
one could tell what constitutes good foam." 331 Nonetheless, the employee found that most of the "scientific information submitted was not
real new." 332 The Commission Program Manager agreed that the input
was "generally quite useful," adding that participant compensation had
permitted the CPSC to hear directly from injured persons how they had
discovered the UFFI-related disorder-data which "weighed heavily" in
the final decision. 333 An agency chairman said that "small business people, installers and homeowners were extremely useful," serving as "experts" who related actual experiences and identified more precisely the
causes of a "problem with a consumer product" that seemed to "arise in
users' hands" and about which little information was available. 334 Reimbursement also allowed the Consumer Product Safety Commission to acquire "much more specific data, and a lot of ideas"not available in
Washington, D.C., where "proceedings are dominated by experts and
professional lobbyists" whose input is "very different from installers and
users." 335

11.

Citizens Band Omnidirectional Antennas

Between 1980 and 1982, CPSC technical personnel worked on a citizens band omnidirectional antenna standard with the following funded
people: an electrical contractor who petitioned the agency to adopt a
standard; an antenna company president; the president of a CB operators' group; a retired National Bureau of Standards chemist; an attorney
who had represented rural utilities; a retired teacher with experience in
labeling; and a professor with expertise on the dangers posed by high
voltage lines. 336 The individuals attended development sessions and public meetings, commented on "hazard analysis and technical work," and
330. Id.
331. Telephone interview with CPSC employee 2.
332. Id.
333. Telephone interview with CPSC employee 3.
334. Telephone interview with Susan King, supra note 220.
335. Id.
336. See CPSC Study, supra note 59, at 4, 8. Accord 47 Fed. Reg. 36,186, 36,188 (1982). Cf. id.
at 36,187-201; 46 Fed. Reg. 41,081-91 (1981) (discussion of proceeding).
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drafted the standard. 337 The CPSC issued a proposal in August 1981 and
a final rule one year later. 338 By that time antenna sales, and deaths and
injuries ascribed to the product, had declined so substantially that the
need for mandatory controls was reduced. 339 Thus, the standard imposed minimized competition in an already over-concentrated
industry. 340
These factors, and several others, such as the difficulties entailed in
securing reliable assessments from observers or much information of
value from the CPSC's file, hamper analysis of citizen input. 341 Commission staff evaluations generally were positive. The agency self-study said
that consumers "provided valuable assistance to staff," and that public
"participation in actual drafting of safety standards [was] one of the best
ways to assure" that those safety standards were "reasonable and workable."342 The report indicated that citizen involvement in standard development was "responsive to regulatory reform concerns" and was
"working well" in this proceeding. 343 One Commission staffer found
that the effort, which advanced antenna safety, was "one of CPSC's major success stories," and the employee believed that each citizen "made
excellent contributions" in specific areas of expertise and did an "excellent job of providing quality input." 344 A second agency staff member
found "consumers useful because of their personal experience," and the
employee concluded that they "served best as sounding boards,"
although the staffer thought it unrealistic to expect that they would con337. See CPSC Study, supra note 59, at 4, 8. Accord 47 Fed. Reg. 36,186, 36,188 (1982).
338. See 47 Fed. Reg. 36,186 (1982); 46 Fed. Reg. 41,081 (1981).
339. See 47 Fed. Reg. 36,186, 36,197 (1982); Hearings on Department of Housing and Urban
Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1981 Before Subcomm. on HUD-Independent Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 73 (1980) (declines);
cf telephone interview with industry representative 1 (antenna sales 3.5 million in 1976 and 50,000
in 1982); telephone interview with funded participant 1 (by the time CPSC decided to regulate product, sales so reduced that $25,000 could not be raised to develop voluntary standard).
340. See 4 7 Fed. Reg. 36, 186, 36, 195, 36, 198 ( 1982); Letter from funded participant 2 to CPSC
employee l; telephone interviews with funded participant 2 and industry representative 1, supra note
339.
341. I had difficulty finding sufficiently neutral observers. Moreover, the endeavor's polycentric
and lengthy nature complicated analysis because no one could have much impact. See infra notes
353, 358 and accompanying text.
342. See CPSC Study, supra note 59, at 4, ii.
343. Id.
344. See telephone interview with CPSC employee 1, supra note 340 (first two quotations); Transcnpt, Third Public Meeting for Development of a Proposed Mandatory Consumer Product Safety
Standard for CB Base Station Omnidirectional Antennas, at 49-50, Bethesda, Md. (July 14, 1980)
(third quotation).
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tribute directly to the technical requirements for development of a standard. 345 A third staffer said that the citizens "proved the process was
feasible" and could "produce workable standards," adding that some
participants had taught the CPSC much about high voltage technology
which would have value in other contexts, although most members of the
public "did not make a major contribution." 346
Extra-agency evaluation was mixed, but more critical. The president
of the CB operators' group principally seemed to be promoting his organizational interests, as witnessed by his unproductive inquiries in an early
session. 347 He thought that most consumers "offered little input, had no
familiarity with CBs and did not want to buck [the] CPSC" and that
some were "along for the ride," but the group's president did offer "suggestions added to the proposed standard" and say that the work "had
been a great exercise and very educational." 348 The antenna company
president said that several citizens "had no views and a few had no understanding" of the impact of CB antenna regulation, although his suggestions did prompt staff revision of some agency propos_als, while three
consumers believed that the company president represented producers in
a way that enabled them to stay in business but with improved safety. 349
The comments of the two presidents were confirmed by others interested
in antenna production. One said that the reimbursed "group was not
very astute," some of its members imposed restrictions without understanding the science, and a few had so little technical knowledge that
345. Telephone interview with CPSC employee 2. Accord Transcript, Third Public Meeting,
supra note 344, at 68; Transcript, Fourth Public Meeting for Development of a Proposed Mandatory
Consumer Product Safety Standard for CB Base Station Omnidirectional Antennas, at 45, 51,
Bethesda, Md. (Nov. 17, 1980).
346. See Transcript, Fourth Public Meeting, supra note 345, at 51 (first two quotations); telephone interview with CPSC employee 3 (remainder). Cf telephone interview with CPSC employee 4
(funded participation extensive, pretty helpful as a whole, and not too onerous).
347. See Transcript, Second Public Meeting for Development of a Proposed Mandatory Consumer Product Safety Standard for CB Base Station Omnidirectional Antennas, Bethesda, Md. (May
10, 1980).
348. See telephone interview with funded participant 1, supra note 339 (first two quotations);
Memorandum, CPSC Staff Response to Public Participants' Comments on Draft Standard During
Fourth Public Meeting, from Robert Northedge, Chairman, Performance Requirements Subcomm.
to Dennis McCoskrie, CPSC Electrical Team Representative for CB Antennas, 1-2 (Feb. 19, 1981)
(third quotation); Transcript, Fourth Public Meeting, supra note 345, at 149 (fourth quotation).
349. See telephone interview with funded participant 2, supra note 340 (quotation); Transcript,
Fourth Public Meeting, supra note 345, at 21, 44-45; Minutes, Human Factors and Labelling Comm.
(Nov. 1980) (prompting revision); telephone interviews with funded participants 3, 4, 5 (consumers'
beliefs).
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their "contributions were practically nil." 350 The other evaluator found
that most participants were " 'professional consumers' who probably
could not contribute to standard development." 351
Even ostensibly more neutral observers were not very positive. The
funded professor said that most consumers were "unable to contribute
much to standard writing," and several lacked "technical background"
or the ability "to comprehend the problem." 352 He also observed that
the quantity and conflicting nature of compensated individuals' input
"made it very difficult to get anything done." 353 The professor believed
that his own "impact was minor," but a committee head stated that the
professor "wrote a very good draft," while two funded people viewed the
professor as a quite competent, but unassertive, engineer. 354 The funded
lawyer was similarly, albeit more, impressed with citizen participation
and the project's progression. 355 He said that although the consumers
were initially uncomfortable and at a disadvantage, partly because
agency staff failed to prepare or welcome them, the work went smoothly
once citizens were educated and staff overcame their ambivalence. The
attorney assigned the staff an "excellent rating for acceptance, use of and
relationship with" consumers. 356 The lawyer helped focus the inquiry
and suggested definitional changes which the Consumer Product Safety
Commission adopted, while two citizens believed the attorney was productive and found valuable his legal expertise. 357
The funded electrical contractor thought that a number of participants
provided helpful input, although some did not. The individual found
that the forum provided a "wide open opportunity to present" and challenge ideas, and concluded that while everyone considered the "impacts,
350. See telephone interview with industry representative 2.
351. Telephone interview with industry representative I, supra note 339.
352. Telephone interview with funded participant 5, supra note 349.
353. Id. Cf. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-404
(1978); Stewart, supra note 4, at 1777 (problems ofpolycentric decisionmaking).
354. See telephone interview with funded participant 5, supra note 349 (first quotation); Transcript, Second Public Meeting, supra note 347, at 20 (second); telephone interviews with funded
participants 3, 4, supra note 349 (two people's views).
355. See telephone interview with funded participant 4, supra note 349; Letter from funded participant 4 to CPSC employee 1 (Nov. 20, 1980).
356. See Letter, supra note 355; telephone interview with funded participant 4, supra note 349.
357. See, e.g., Transcript, Second Public Meeting, supra note 347, at 46 (focusing); Memorandum, supra note 348, at 5 (suggesting changes). See telephone interviews with funded participants 3,
5, supra note 349 (citizens' beliefs); see also Letter, supra note 355 (suggestions for CPSC improvements in funded participation).
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relevance, and technicalities of electrical power line accidents, hazards,
production, design, testing problems and compliance procedures," and
learned from each other, the CPSC let the project become "so drawn out
[that] it was impossible to act." 358 The electrical contractor offered helpful insights on educating CB owners and on the Commission staff drafts,
which prompted revisions; two consumers found that the contractor was
assertive and knew the problem's technical aspects, but a third citizen
believed that the contractor "did not contribute much. " 359 The retired
chemist believed that most of the participants "did a good job and were
pretty thorough" and thought that some were "especially competent to
treat technical issues." 360 Although one member of the public found that
the chemist "had some valuable things to say" and was "vocal on certain
questions," two others believed that she was not very helpful. 361 The
retired teacher was "impressed with [consumers'] intense care and
thought," adding that "all sides were presented fairly with reasonable
altematives."362 One citizen said that the teacher "contributed new ideas
on psychological effects and labeling," while a second lauded her "technical writing skills," even though two others believed that she offered
little input, and several thought that she "enjoyed the free trips." 363

III.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
COMMISSION EXPERIENCE

This section first offers specific conclusions about compensated noncommercial involvement at the Consumer Product Safety Commission:
358. See telephone interview with funded participant 3, supra note 349 (first and third quotations); Letter from funded participant 3 to Sadye Dunn, CPSC Secretary (Sept. 11, 1981) (second
quotation).
359. See Transcript, Second Public Meeting, supra note 347, at 52-53 (educating CB owners);
Minutes, supra note 349 (prompting revisions); telephone interview with funded participant 4, supra
note 349, and telephone interview with funded participant 6 (two consumers' findings); telephone
interview with funded participant 5, supra note 349 (third's belief). Funded participant 2, supra
note 340, asserted the electrical contractor would "never have petitioned CPSC," had he known "it
would come to all this." But cf. telephone interview with funded participant 3, supra note 349 (no
such indication from contractor).
360. See telephone interview with funded participant 6, supra note 359.
361. See telephone interview with funded participant 4, supra note 349 (citizen's finding); telephone interviews with funded participants 3, 5, supra note 349 (two others' thoughts).
362. See Letter from funded participant 7 to CPSC employee 5 (Feb. 1, 1981).
363. See telephone interviews with funded participant 6, supra note 360, and funded participant
3, supra note 349 (first and second citizens); telephone interviews with funded participants 4, 5, supra
note 349 (beliefs of two more); telephone interviews with funded participant I, supra note 339, and
funded participant 2, supra note 340 (several others' thoughts).
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its advantages and disadvantages, the activity's relative and comparative
value, a contextual analysis of participation's worth, and lessons from the
Commission experience. General conclusions follow.
A.

Specific Conclusions
J.

Advantages and Disadvantages

Funded involvement in CPSC proceedings had many beneficial effects
which were manifested throughout the agency decisional processes. 364
At the outset, compensated parties created frameworks for expeditious,
reasoned decisionmaking, by helping to identify all interests affected and
assigning them value; broadly defining and incisively evaluating the questions to be addressed; and designating a wide range of potential solutions.
Funded participants presented new data or arguments and fresh insights
on matters in issue. They also developed and applied innovative testing
techniques, while criticizing and improving the methodologies of others,
using the approaches thus created or upgraded to generate helpful data.
Reimbursed entities comprehensively explored solutions, searching for
the least restrictive ones. They devised, suggested, and convinced the
Commission to adopt optional, less onerous, and novel means of accomplishing its goals. Moreover, the CPSC used much of this input to reach
and justify decisions. In short, those paid promoted fair, accurate, thorough and prompt work; sharpened the issues and focused them for resolution; provided data, ideas, and perspectives which the agency might not
have received; helped it assess the material submitted; enhanced appreciation of the entire process' implications; and promoted reasoned, supportable, confident decisionmaking.
The quality of funded input, which is not wholly severable from its
efficacy, was respectable. 365 Most contributions had substantive validity
and even those which were rejected improved analysis by forcing others
to treat them. Compensated parties provided relevant, supported data,
arguments, and perspectives on issues not available, while they identified,
and demanded exploration of, questions which would not otherwise have
been addressed. Reimbursed persons competently presented views,
clearly explaining and substantiating their own; challenging and demanding explication of those they opposed; and fairly and rigorously debating
364. The advantages and disadvantages listed below are meant to comprise a brief and selective,
but representative, summary of the proceeding-specific analysis in § Il.B of this Article.
365. For a discussion of quality and efficacy, see supra § 11.A.2.a of this Article.
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ideas elicited. When participants represented a specific interest, that interest was promoted effectively in ways that minimized bias. Funded individuals and organizations were intelligent, conscientious, perceptive,
cooperative, creative, aggressive, and realistic, and they served well as
sounding boards, conciliators, gadflies and devil's advocates.
Reimbursement had many benefits related less directly to decisional
processes. It fostered participation of people, groups, trade associations
and others that had been involved minimally or been excluded from administrative decisionmaking. 366 Funding rectified an imbalance in perspectives and data proferred to the CPSC, permitting non-commercial
interests to participate more equally with industry. 367 These reimbursed
parties afforded numerous advantages that made compensated activity
relatively inexpensive as a general proposition and less costly than the
major mechanisms for acquiring decisional input. 368
But funded involvement also had a negative or no impact on decisional
processes, was mediocre, and had certain detrimental implications more
removed from decisionmaking. This participation warrants less extensive treatment, principally because most disadvantages were the opposites of the benefits. For example, reimbursed input was duplicative,
flawed or unsupported, which had the important deleterious consequence
of delay. Moreover, some funded parties failed to present capably their
perspectives, or were unprepared, gullible or even recalcitrant. Furthermore, compensation did not invariably promote involvement of new interests or ameliorate participatory imbalance; indeed, a few of those
parties who were awarded grants had participated previously without
funding.

2.

Relative and Comparative Value

In terms of the relative efficacy of reimbursed activity, approximately
366. For example, numerous individuals who testified in public sessions previously had been
involved minimally or been excluded.
367. These included consumer groups and individual citizens that testified in public sessions and
submitted written comments.
368. The CPSC paid $25,000 in fees and costs for compensated activity during the last year of
funding. See CPSC Study, supra note 59, at 1. Some activity was cheap, because industry donated
certain services and individuals worked for less than their normal rates. The major techniques used
to secure decisional input are supplementation of staff and employment of extra-agency contractors.
See Tobias, supra note 2, at 953. Cf HousE OFFEROR REPORT, supra note 70, at 10 (compensated
activity cheaper than staff supplementation); supra note 287 and accompanying text (cheaper than
contractors).
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fifteen percent was effective, twenty-five percent was ineffective and the
remainder was in between. As to relative quality, approximately twentyfive percent was high, fifteen percent was low, and the rest was in the
middle area. Nearly all funded involvement offered some advantage related less directly to decisionmaking, although one-half to three-quarters
provided multiple benefits, while fifty to sixty-six percent afforded meaningful advantages. Compensation also enabled citizens to provide input
of quality equal to other participants or techniques for facilitating public
involvement or improving decisionmaking. Moreover, reimbursement
permitted consumers to have more advantageous, and fewer deleterious,
effects on decisionmaking, as well as more beneficial, and fewer detrimental, impacts pertaining less closely to the decisional process than such
other participants and techniques. 369

3.

Contextual Analysis of Efficacy

Funded activity obviously is not efficacious in every context. Yet it is
difficult to delineate precisely when such involvement was more or less
effective at the CPSC, especially for purposes of accurate extrapolation to
other contexts or agencies. 370 The principal reason for this is that relative efficacy is a function of certain variables which are present, interact,
and influence decisionmaking in specific circumstances. Relative effectiveness at the Commission can be identified in terms of many such variables: what the agency needed to make the best decision; participant
ability to satisfy that need; timing and extent of reimbursed activity; and
the type of proceeding, of issues to be resolved, of input provided, and of
participant. 371 The most significant variables appear to be agency need
369. All estimates in this paragraph are rough approximations. Cf S. REP. No. 94-863, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (other techniques); Tobias, supra note 2, at 953; supra note 368 (cost comparisons with other techniques).
370. It is difficult because the inquiry is so situation-specific. Indeed, even delineating instances
of relative efficacy at the CPSC may not permit accurate extrapolation to possible future funded
activity at the agency. See infra notes 371-72 and accompanying text.
371. As to the type of proceeding involved, funded activity generally was more efficacious in
"offeror-like" initiatives-those proceedings that were innovative, cooperative, and informal, such as
the proceeding to develop a mandatory safety standard for CB antennas-rather than rulemaking or
adjudication. Compensated participation in public meetings usually was less effective than comparable activity in notice-comment rulemaking and adjudicatory hearings. Reimbursed involvement had
a somewhat greater impact in initiatives that began later in the CPSC's history. Funded participation was most efficacious in the UFFI matter. Thus, although the contexts in which funded activity
had more or less impact can be designated by proceeding types much seems attributable to other
parameters and exogenous factors.
A second parameter was the extent of compensated participation. Participation occurring over a
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and participant capability, although external factors, such as congressional pressure, may also have an effect. Thus, while particular situations of relative efficacy can be designated for the CPSC, that exercise is
not very instructive because the inquiry necessarily entails a case-by-case
analysis of the variables that comprise every decisional process, each of
which must be identified, isolated, and examined in terms of impact. 372

4.

Lessons

The Consumer Product Safety Commission's experiment in subsidized
participatory democracy offers numerous valuable and unexpected lessons. Most importantly, the experience teaches that non-commercial interests can influence beneficially decisional processes. The experience
also affords instructive insights about contexts in which it is probable
that decisionmaking will be affected advantageously.
Decisional
processes are more likely to be enhanced when agency receptivity to, and
need for, public input are substantial and participants' ability to satisfy
that need is substantial. But sufficient resources must be provided to permit adequate citizen preparation. Moreover, the decisional processes
may be affected by considerations unrelated to, and beyond the control
of, funded parties, such as industry recalcitrance. 373
longer period generally was more effective. A third parameter was timing. Funded activity gener·
ally had more impact when it came earlier in the decisional process. A fourth parameter was the
type of substantive issues involved. In an absolute sense, reimbursed involvement was more efficacious where the questions were less "refined" and "technical," and less amenable to resolution
through application of specialized expertise. This reflects the technical complexion of issues before
the CPSC, the agency's needs, the participants' capabilities, and the mismatching of the participants'
skills with the CPSC's needs. Thus, in real terms, funded activity was more effective when the issues
were more responsive to the particular competence that participants possessed.
The issues parameter is closely related to two others: kind of input and CPSC need. In an absolute
sense, compensated involvement had more impact when input contributed to the need for issue
identification and refinement or when there were less technical questions or less need for particularized knowledge. Thus, funded activity was more effective where the "inputs needed" called for
greater application of the kind of expertise that participants possessed.
A seventh parameter was type of participant. In an absolute sense, national consumer groups
were more efficacious than citizens. Among individuals, technical consumers had more impact,
while descending efficacy could be plotted along a spectrum from engineers to doctors, attorneys,
consumer advocates, students and homemakers. But these views again reflect a mismatching of
participant ability, issue composition, and CPSC need. In real terms, reimbursed activity was more
effective where the paid participant possessed the kind of competence that the CPSC needed.
372. Thus, the inquiry is polycentric. See Fuller, supra note 353, at 394-404; Stewart, supra note
4, at 1777 (problems of polycentric decisionmaking).
373. The lessons in this paragraph are drawn primarily from the proceeding-specific analysis in
§ 11.B of this Article and the remainder of § III.
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The experiment conducted by the Consumer Product Safety Commission provides evidence of much of this. The agency occasionally mismatched its need and participant competence in the selection process.
When the Commission required technical input, the agency paid lay consumers, and when negotiators were needed, antagonistic citizens received
compensation. In these situations, reimbursed involvement was less successful than it might have been. Even when the agency's choice of participants was more appropriate, the CPSC mismatched awards, paying so
little that efficacy was jeopardized. The agency funded in some contexts
where the need for reimbursed input, or the possibility of influencing
decisionmaking, was minimal. Citizens received compensation in circumstances where no one could have much impact because of the procedures, as in single hearings during five-year proceedings, or when
industry was cooperative. Correspondingly, consumers were paid when
the CPSC already had reached a decision or had improperly chosen
products to regulate, techniques for achieving agency goals, or procedures to use. 374 Thus, the Consumer Product Safety Commission's experience instructs that funding programs must be planned properly and
administered carefully with attention to factors like those above if reimbursed activity is to be effective. Most problems can be solved or are
amenable to amelioration, but a few may be intractable. 375 Moreover,
participant funding was reasonably inexpensive. The costs of compensation in terms both of actual payments to citizens and program operation
were relatively insubstantial compared to other devices for securing decisional input. 376
The CPSC funding effort also teaches that a nascent agency, which is
attempting to establish itself, gain constituents, and set priorities as well
as experiment with a new statute and novel administrative procedures,
may not be the ideal governmental unit to implement a newly created
concept like reimbursement. 377 Thus, for some similar, and numerous
374. Textual examples of mismatching in this paragraph are drawn from the proceeding-specific
analysis in § 11.B of this Article. Cf s. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 189-96 (1982)
(mismatching in other administrative contexts). Indeed, it is ironic that an agency so committed to
openness in government, citizen participation, and public input in its decisionmaking could so ineffectively administer funding that compensated activity's efficacy cannot be ascertained definitely.
375. For the most comprehensive, incisive work on funding program administration, see Boyer,
supra notes 14, 62.
376. See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
377. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 68, at § IV (similar assertions regarding implementation of offeror
procedure). But cf. infra text accompanying note 378 (more established agency like FTC "unfortu-
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different, reasons, the CPSC may have been like the "FTC of the l 970's,
in many respects," a "particularly unfortunate time and place to experiment with direct funding for public participation."378 If two of the three
most ambitious reimbursement endeavors in government can be so characterized, however, it is fair to ask whether the compensation idea itself
is flawed. The above analysis helps answer the question whether the
CPSC funding effort was properly discontinued. Given the apparent efficacy and quality of reimbursed involvement, the difficulties entailed in
managing the compensation endeavor, and choices regarding commitment of scarce resources, program suspension seems to have been
rational.
Assessment of the CPSC's funding experience also yields informative
ideas about evaluating efficacy. The analysis indicates that participant
compensation remains a "politically volatile" issue, requiring consideration of evaluators' perspectives. I gleaned very different impressions
from reviewing secondary sources, interviewing observers, and reading
the actual input, the last of which was often strikingly different.
Although I found that the final source, the CPSC staff and certain nonagency assessors, were most reliable, "rigorous" analysis as described below is necessary. 379

B.

General Conclusions

On balance, I found funded activity at the Consumer Product Safety
Commission sufficiently promising to warrant reinstitution and continued experimentation in appropriately tailored contexts, there and at
nate place to experiment with direct funding"). As to funding's new creation and lack of prior
experience with it, see supra § I.A of this Article.
378. Boyer, supra note 14, at 140. It is interesting that the three year experiment with funding
under the Equal Access to Justice Act recently was deemed sufficiently worthwhile to warrant permanent institution. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
379. See infra notes 384-86 and accompanying text. Of course, many lessons derived from the
CPSC's funding experience are not new or unpredictable. But they are helpful, especially insofar as
they document and confirm what has been observed. Compensated activity's advantages and disadvantages, relative and comparative value, and contextual worth were similar to what has been observed and might have been expected. For example, funded parties beneficially influenced decisional
processes by providing new data or novel views on existing issues, but they also adversely affected
decisionmaking by tendering duplicative or flawed material. Moreover, those possessing specialized
expertise were generally more effective, as could have been expected at an agency where technical
issues predominate. Furthermore, the CPSC experienced difficulties in program administration similar to those of other agencies. The conclusions pertaining to funded activity's evaluation as well
were predictable. For instance, the activity was neither as bad as its detractors asserted nor as good
as its proponents claimed, and industry found it less effective than consumers.
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other agencies. Such experimentation would permit agencies to ascertain
more precisely the value of participant compensation. Indeed, reimbursed involvement at the Consumer Product Safety Commission was
surprisingly good, given the constraints.
IV.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE: POLICY AND POLITICS

Participant funding should be revived and rigorously evaluated, other
mechanisms for rectifying the imbalance in input and improving decisionmaking should be explored and analyzed, and the cost and efficacy of
these alternatives should be compared. 380 Although the Consumer Product Safety Commission's experience supports reinstitution, it was not so
successful as to justify unrestricted experimentation at the Commission
or government-wide. Selective work at the CPSC and other agencies
ought to occur in contexts where it proved most effective, seemed promising or where no experience exists. While there should be maXimum
diversity and flexibility to experiment, some preference may be accorded
to situations where funding has already been tried to save start-up and
day-to-day costs and to capitalize on accumulated experience. 381 Agencies should properly plan reimbursement efforts, drawing especially upon
the experience of the CPSC and other units of government. Agencies
should begin by carefully studying participant compensation to determine whether it would enhance decisionmaking, and, if so, identify contexts where this would be most likely. Agencies lacking specific
authority or sufficient appropriations should seek the requisite power and
money from Congress. These agencies then should institute programs
that draw upon prior experience with the funding concept, and maintain
maximum flexibility to experiment, tinker, and refine, while paying close
attention to administrative detail. More specifically, agencies should
carefully choose appropriate circumstances for reimbursement, and rigorously select applicants for awards, by matching agency need with participant ability. Agencies also should allocate sufficient resources to
380. These mechanisms are explored in S. REP. No. 94-863, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Lazarus & Onek, supra note 5; the first set of sources cited supra note 158. The textual suggestions and
those below are for prospective application. But studies of prior funded activity, like this one, should
be undertaken, and the conclusions reached should be applied, where appropriate. See supra notes
158-59 and accompanying text.
381. For example, the FDA might be a prime candidate, because its funding experiment enjoyed
some success and its Office of Consumer Affairs, which implemented the program, has that and
other relevant experience. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 943-44, 952 n.270, 953 nn.271-73; supra note
368 and accompanying text.
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permit effective citizen involvement and agency program administration
and to closely monitor applicant performance. 382
Congress can best implement these suggestions because it can study
systematically prior experience with funded activity and identify and specifically prescribe proper contexts for reinstitution through authorizing
legislation. Congress also can provide adequate resources for efficacious
public participation and program operation in appropriations statutes.
Even if Congress chooses not to pass substantive measures, it should remove appropriations restrictions on participant compensation. Agencies
should institute funding pursuant to their implied power if Congress does
not specifically authorize reimbursement. Courts should uphold this exercise of agency power unless it clearly exceeds the agency's statutory
authority. 383
The compensated involvement that occurs should be analyzed pursuant to the touchstone of "rigor."384 This means closely assessing all, or a
representative sample of, the activity which transpires. 385 The analysis
requires an independent, extra-agency evaluator, such as the ACUS,
which possesses sufficient knowledge about the funding idea and methods
for its analysis, agency decisionmaking and the administrative process, as
well as adequate detachment to maximize accuracy. Evaluators should
use pre-defined impact parameters, attend agency proceedings where input is contributed, attempt to isolate all relevant variables to ascertain
accurately cause and effect, and conduct analyses for a sufficient period
to provide some assurance of statistical validity. 386 Analysts should examine reimbursed participation at all agencies and attempt to draw more
definitive conclusions about funded involvement, especially its relative
efficacy. Finally, evaluators should compare and contrast the effectiveness and expense of participant compensation with other techniques for
remedying participatory imbalance and enhancing decisional processes.
382. The best work on these, and many other, aspects of program administration is Boyer supra
notes 14, 62. Cf supra § II.A of this Article; Tobias, supra note 2, at § 4 (suggestions and lessons
regarding program administration).
383. For analysis of all the assertions in this paragraph, see id.
384. A definition, or sense, of "rigor" can be derived from reading the remainder of this para·
graph; the "ideal" parameters are described in § I.A of this Article, or Rosenbaum, supra note 100.
385. For difficulties involved in selecting a representative sample, see supra § I.A of this Article,
especially supra note 160 and sources cited therein.
386. Helpful work on "evaluation research methodology" appears in Boyer, supra notes 14, 62;
Rosenbaum, supra note 100; Rosener, supra note 100.
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CONCLUSION

Government-sponsored public involvement at the Consumer Product
Safety Commission was an instructive experiment in subsidized participatory democracy. Although participant reimbursement was flawed
in certain ways, it possessed sufficient value to warrant properly circumscribed future work. Congress and the agencies should heed the admonition of a former Commissioner who strongly supported funding:
Participant compensation is beneficial but not everywhere, everytime, or
for everyone. 387

387. Telephone interview with Commissioner David Pittle. Indeed, responsive to this admonition are the recent congressional reauthorization of the Equal Access to Justice Act, see supra note
29, and burgeoning successful agency experimentation with analogous mechanisms, like resource
pools, for facilitating non-commercial involvement in negotiated rulemakings, see 1 C.F.R. § 305.855 para. 9 (1987).

